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Abstract: In the global backdrop of backlash against bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) and the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), this paper 
critically studies India’s new Model BIT, adopted in 2016 as a response to 
increasing number of ISDS claims brought against India. This paper studies the 
Indian Model BIT, which heralds a new era of India’s BIT practice, from the 
standpoint of two key objectives that the Indian government claims the Model 
BIT achieves. First, the claim that the purpose of the Model BIT is to balance 
investment protection with host state’s right to regulate. Second, the claim that 
the Model BIT aims to make the treaty provisions more precise so as to minimize 
arbitral discretion. This paper shows that for most of the key provisions given in 
the Model BIT, contrary to the Indian government’s claim, India has not been 
able to strike a balance between investment protection and host State’s right to 
regulate. For most of the provisions, the scale tilts in favor of the host state. This 
paper also shows that many provisions in the Indian Model BIT, contrary to the 
government’s claim, are vague and imprecise and thus, continue to grant 
significant discretion to ISDS arbitral tribunals to determine the actual import 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are treaties between two countries 
aimed at protecting investments made by investors of both countries.1 BITs 
protect investments by imposing conditions on the regulatory behavior of 
the host state and thus, prevent undue interference with the rights of the 
foreign investor.2 These conditions include restricting the host state from 
expropriating investments, barring for public interest with adequate 
compensation; imposing obligations on host states to accord fair and 
equitable treatment (FET) to foreign investment and not to discriminate 
against foreign investment; allowing for repatriation of profits subject to 
conditions agreed to between the two countries; and most importantly, 
allowing individual investors to bring cases against host states if the latter’s 
sovereign regulatory measures are not consistent with the BIT, for monetary 
compensation. This is known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).3  
 
 1 For a general discussion on BITs see R. DOLZER & C. SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2012); A. NEWCOMBE & L. PARADELL, LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 1-73 (2009); JESWALD SALACUSE, THE LAW OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES (2015).   
 2 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 13. 
 3 In this paper, ISDS and ISDS system are used interchangeably. While ISDS refers to 
just the dispute settlement system between the investor and the State, ‘ISDS system’ means 
not just the dispute settlement system but the entire universe of BITs and investment treaty 
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There has been a steady increase in the number of BITs across the 
world—from 500 in 1990s to more than 3,324 by the end of 2016.4 This 
increasing mass of BITs has led to a significant increase in investor-state 
disputes in international investment law5 where a wide array of sovereign 
regulatory measures, such as environmental policy,6 regulatory issues 
related to supply of drinking water,7 monetary policy,8 laws and policies 
related to taxation,9 and regulations related to health10 have been challenged 
by foreign investors as potential breaches of BITs. Foreign investors 
challenging sovereign regulatory measures of host states under BITs should 
not come as a surprise because that is what BITs are meant to do—to hold 
 
arbitration.   
 4 This includes 2957 stand-alone investment treaties and 367 Treaties with Investment 
Provisions (TIPs) or investment chapters in FTAs. See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT 
REPORT – INVESTOR NATIONALITY: POLICY CHALLENGES  101 (2017) [hereinafter, UNCTAD, 
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017].  
 5 From a negligible number in early 1990s, the total number of known treaty-based ISDS 
cases rose to 767 as of 1st January 2017; see UNCTAD, Investment Dispute Settlement 
Navigator, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS.  
 6 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 
Award (Aug. 30, 2000); Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, NAFTA-
UNCITRAL, Award, (Aug. 3, 2005). 
 7 Biwater Gauff Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 
Award, (Jul. 24, 2008). 
 8 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, (May 12, 
2005), [hereinafter CMS Award]; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Application for 
Annulment of the Award, (Sept. 25, 2007) [hereinafter CMS Annulment]; Enron Corporation 
and Ponderosa Assents, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Award, 
(May 22, 2007) [hereinafter Enron Award]; Enron Creditors Recovery Corp v. Argentina, 
ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Application for Annulment 
of the Award, (Jul. 30, 2010), [hereinafter Enron Annulment]; Sempra Energy International 
v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16, Award, (Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter 
Sempra Award]; Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Application for Annulment of the Award, 
(Jun. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Sempra Annulment]; LG&E Energy Corporation v. The 
Argentine Republic, ICISD Case No ARB/02/1, Award, (Jul. 25, 2007) [hereinafter LG&E]; 
Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, 
Award, (Sept. 5, 2008) [hereinafter, Continental Casualty Award]. 
 9 Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. 
UN3467, Final Award, (Jul. 1, 2004); EnCana Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA 
Case No. UN3481, Award, (Feb.3, 2006); Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award (Dec. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Feldman]; 
Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Liability, (Dec. 14, 2014) 
 10 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (Dec. 17, 2015); Philip Morris 
Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (Jul. 8, 2016).  
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states accountable for the exercise of public power while dealing with 
foreign investment. However, adjudication of such a wide gamut of 
sovereign regulatory measures by ISDS tribunals as potential breaches of 
BITs, involving award of substantive damages to foreign investors,11 thus 
resulting in the diversion of taxpayer’s money to foreign investors, have 
generated a backlash against international investment law, which has been 
well documented.12 This backlash has been further fueled by instances 
where a similar set of facts,13 or the same provision of a BIT,14 has been 
interpreted differently by tribunals. One of the chief reasons for the wide 
range of sovereign decisions of host states being caught in the broad net of 
ISDS is the vague language of BITs.15 For example, imprecise and broad 
 
 11 See Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, (PCA Case No. 
AA 226), Final Award, (Jul. 18, 2014); Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The 
Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, (Jul. 18, 2014); Veteran Petroleum Limited 
(Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 228, (Jul. 18, 2014); see also 
Martine Dietrich Brauch, Yukos v. Russia: Issues and legal reasoning behind US$50 billion 
awards, INV. TREATY NEWS (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/09/04/yukos-v-
russia-issues-and-legal-reasoning-behind-us50-billion-awards/. 
 12 L.T. WELLS, Backlash to Investment Arbitration: Three Causes in THE BACKLASH 
AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, 341 (M. Waibel et al. eds., 2010); see also Stephan W. 
Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and 
Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L. L 57, 69 
(2011) who states: “the extent to which investment treaties limit a state’s regulatory powers 
and subject the exercise of such powers to liability claims by foreign investors may become 
the litmus test for the future viability of the system”; see also Susan D. Franck, The 
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005); GUS VAN HARTEN, 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); A. Kaushal, Revisiting History: 
How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 
HARV. INT’L. L.J. 491 (2009); R. HOWSE, Sovereignty, Lost and Found in REDEFINING 
SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, 72-73 (W. Shan et al. eds., 2008); B. 
Choudhary, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the 
Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit, 41 VAND. J.  TRANSNAT’L. L. 775 
(2008).   
 13 The most commonly stated example of this is the Lauders case where two arbitration 
tribunals gave different decisions to essentially the same set of facts for disputes brought 
under two different BITs. The cases are: CME Czech Republic BV v. The Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Final Award (Mar. 14, 2003) and Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 
Final Award (Sept. 3, 2001).  
 14 The Argentine cases on Article XI of the Treaty between United States of America and 
the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of 
Investment (signed Nov. 14, 1991, entered into force Oct. 20, 1994) [hereinafter US-
Argentina BIT], are a good example of such inconsistency. See supra note 8. 
 15 See Schill, supra note 12, at 67-68; WELLS, supra note 12, at 342; Suzanne A. Spears, 
The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment Agreements, 13 
J. INT. ECON. L. 1037, 1040 (2010); JOSE E. ALVAREZ & K. KHAMSI, The Argentine Crisis 
and Foreign Investors in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 
2008-09 379, 472-478 (Karl P. Sauvant ed. 2009); M.A. Clodfelter, The Adaptation of States 
to the Changing World of Investment Protection through Model BITs, 24 ICSID REV - 
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provisions like FET become suitable candidates for broad and inconsistent 
treaty interpretations.16 The textual indeterminacy of BITs has resulted in 
divergent and inconsistent legal conclusions.17 Such indeterminacy in treaty 
drafting gives a fair degree of discretion to ISDS tribunals to interpret the 
terms occurring in BITs and hence indulge in ‘law-making’ activity.18 Such 
law-making by ISDS tribunals is problematic because states create 
international law while international tribunals are only supposed to interpret 
and apply it.19 However, since treaty parties delegate interpretative power to 
ISDS tribunals, some level of law creation through interpretation is inherent 
in the adjudication process.20 
The backlash or contestation against BITs, due to increased exposure 
to ISDS claims, is evident in state practice.21 This state practice can be 
classified into two categories.22 The first category is states that have 
completely denounced the ISDS system. For example, countries such as 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have denounced the ICSID convention 
(that provides for ISDS mechanism) in 2007, 2009, and 2012 respectively,23 
 
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 165 (2009). 
 16 For example, Vandevelde, writing on the FET provision, states: “because the language 
by its terms can apply to virtually any instance of host-state conduct, it is potentially a basis 
for recovery in any situation”. KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 203 (2010). 
 17 For a detailed discussion on such inconsistent decisions, see Franck, supra note 12, at 
1558-1582; see also AUGUST REINISCH, The Future of Investment Arbitration in. 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH 
SCHREUER 905-908 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).   
 18 Stephan W. Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking, 
12 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1083, 1092-1093 (2011).  
 19 Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation, 104 AM. J. 
INT’L. L.179, 188-89 (2010). 
 20 Id. at 189; MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND 
JUDICIALIZATION 90-135 (2002); David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of 
International Courts and Tribunals, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 401, 406, 408 (2006).  
 21 O.E. Garcia-Bolivar, Sovereignty vs. Investment Protection: Back to Calvo? 24 ICSID 
REV - FOREIGN INV. L. J. 470-47 (2009); see also PRABHASH RANJAN, National Contestation 
of International Investment Law and International Rule of Law in RULE OF LAW AT 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS: CONTESTATIONS AND DEFERENCE 115-142 (M. 
Kanetake & A. Nollkaemper eds. 2016) 
 22 Anthea Roberts has classified the reaction of countries to ISDS in four different 
categories: loyalists, reformists, revolutionaries and undecideds – see Anthea Roberts, The 
Shifting Landscape of Investor-State Arbitration: Loyalists, Reformists, Revolutionaries and 
Undecideds, EJIL Talk (June 15, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-shifting-landscape-of-
investor-state-arbitration-loyalists-reformists-revolutionaries-and-undecideds/ (last visited, 
Aug. 2, 2017) 
 23 See Tania Voon & Andrew D. Mitchell, Denunciation, Termination and Survival: The 
Interplay of Treaty Law and International Investment Law 31:2 ICSID REV – FOREIGN INV. 
L. J. 413-433 (2016). 
RANJAN_JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2017  4:10 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 38:1 (2017) 
6 
and also terminated their respective BITs.24 Similarly, South Africa has 
terminated BITs,25 and has also repudiated the ISDS mechanism.26 A more 
nuanced approach in this category is of countries like Australia that, as a 
response to the Philip Morris dispute,27 initially stated in 2011 that it would 
not have the ISDS provision in its treaties;28 however, changed their 
position in 2013 by stating that it would negotiate for ISDS on a case-by-
case basis.29 The second category is states who are contesting the ISDS 
system, not by taking the extreme step of denouncing BITs, but by 
developing a new BIT practice aimed at balancing investment protection 
and host state’s right to regulate through precise drafting of the substantive 
provisions of these treaties,30 or by reasserting their right to regulate within 
 
 24 Bolivia has terminated its 10 BITs (with Argentina, Austria, BLEU, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United States) out of total 23 BITs; Venezuela has 
terminated its BIT with Netherlands; Ecuador has terminated its 11 BITs  (with Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Romania, and Uruguay) out of total 29 BITs; Indonesia has terminated 26 BITs 
(with Argentina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
India, Italy, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Viet Nam) out of total 71 BITs. See Anthony 
Crockett, Indonesia’s Bilateral Investment Treaties: Between Generations? 30:2 ICSID 
REVIEW – FOREIGN INV. L.J. 437-448 (2015) 
 25 South Africa has terminated its 9 BIT (with Austria, BLEU, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, United Kingdom) out of total 49 BITs most of 
which are not yet in force.  
 26 For more on South Africa’s BIT practice see Engela C. Schlemmer, An Overview of 
South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investment Policy 31 ICSID REV—FOREIGN 
INV. L.J. 167 (2016). See also Michael Webb, New Treatment of Foreign Investors in South 
Africa, http://isds.bilaterals.org/?new-treatment-of-foreign-investors&lang=en (last visited, 
Mar. 26, 2016). Some scholars support countries denouncing the ISDS system. See M. 
SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
(2015).  
 27 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (Dec. 17, 2015). The tobacco 
manufacturing MNC Philip Morris had challenged the plain packaging measures adopted by 
the Australian government alleging that such measures amount to indirect expropriation of 
their trademarks – an investment under the Hong Kong – Australia BIT. The ISDS tribunal 
however declined to exercise jurisdiction in the matter. 
 28 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gillard 
Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading Our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity (April 
2011), http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2011_Gillard%20Govt%20Trade%20Policy%2 
0Statement.pdf; Luke Nottage, Throwing the Baby out with the Bathwater: Australia’s New 
Policy on Treaty Based Investor State Arbitration and its impact on Asia, 37 ASIAN STUD. 
REV. 253-72 (2013); Jürgen Kurtz, Australia’s Rejection of Investor–State Arbitration: 
Causation, Omission and Implication, 27 ICSID REV - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 65 (2012). 
 29 Leon Trakman & David Musayelyan, The Repudiation of Investor–State Arbitration 
and Subsequent Treaty Practice: The Resurgence of Qualified Investor–State Arbitration, 31 
ICSID REV – FOREIGN INV. L.J. 194-218, 200 (2016).  
 30 The US and Canadian Model BITs are examples of countries trying to define 
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these treaties. A good example of this is the investment chapter in the 
recently signed European Union-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (EU-Canada CETA),31 where Article 8.9 specifically 
mentions that the countries reaffirm “their right to regulate within their 
territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of 
public health, safety, the environment, or public morals.”32 Similarly, 
countries wish to amend the existing ISDS system by either making it more 
transparent,33 or by bringing about other kinds of reforms such as 
introducing an appellate mechanism,34 or even developing a world 
investment court system.35 
Against this global backdrop, the purpose of this paper is to examine 
India’s new 2016 Model BIT,36 which is an outcome of India’s review of its 
BITs and the ISDS mechanism. The 2016 Model BIT, unlike the 2003 
Model BIT,37 is very detailed and contains thirty-eight Articles divided into 
 
substantive provisions. See 2012 U.S. Model BIT, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT% 
20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf [hereinafter 2012 US Model BIT]; 2004 Canadian 
Model BIT, http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-Model-en.pdf 
[hereinafter 2004 Canadian Model BIT]; see also Caroline Henckels, Protecting Regulatory 
Autonomy through Greater Precision in Investment Treaties: The TPP, CETA, and TTIP, 19 
J. INT’L. ECON. L 27-50 (2016); see also Peter Muchlinski, Towards a Coherent International 
Investment System: Key Issues in the Reform of International Investment Law in PROSPECTS 
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 411 (Robert Echandi et al., eds., 2012); 
KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 351–72 (2013). 
 31 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada, of the one Part, and 
the European Union and its Member States, of the Other Part, Oct. 30, 2016, Ch. 8 
(Investment) [hereinafter Canada-E.U. CETA]. 
 32 Id. art. 8.9.  
 33 On the issue of reforms to the ISDS system, see Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret, 
Introduction - TDM Special Issue on ‘Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search 
of a Roadmap’ 11 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (TDM) (2014), and other contributions in the 
special issue.  
 34 EUN YOUNG PARK, Appellate Review in Investor State Arbitration in RESHAPING THE 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 443-454 (Jean E. Kalicki et al. eds., 2015),  
 35 See Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and The Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, Chapter II (Investment), section 3, art. 15 (Agreed text as of January 2016); see 
also Piero Bernardini, Reforming Investor State Dispute Settlement: The Need to Balance 
Both Party’s Interest 32:1 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INV. L.J., 38-57 (2017).  
 36 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty 2016, 
http://mof.gov.in/reports/ModelTextIndia_BIT.pdf [hereinafter, 2016 Indian Model BIT] 
Important to keep in mind that the Indian Model BIT contains two dates – 28 December 
2015 given in the letter accompanying the text; and 14 January 2016 on the website of the 
Ministry of Finance, Government of India (http://mof.gov.in/) as the date of adoption of the 
Model BIT. In this paper, we use the 14 January 2016 date, and thus call the Model BIT as 
2016 Indian Model BIT and not 2015 Indian Model BIT.  
 37 Indian Model Text of Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1026.pdf. [hereinafter, 2003 Indian 
Model BIT]. 
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seven chapters. While the 2016 Model BIT has been commented upon,38 
this paper adds value to the existing literature by carrying out a 
comprehensive and detailed analysis of the Model BIT, especially from the 
standpoint of two key objectives that the government claims the Model BIT 
achieves. First, the Indian government claims that the purpose of the Model 
BIT is to provide “appropriate protection to foreign investors in India . . . 
while maintaining a balance between investor’s rights and the government’s 
obligations.”39 The Indian government told the parliament the “new Indian 
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty text is aimed at providing appropriate 
protection to foreign investors in India and Indian investors in the foreign 
country, in the light of relevant international precedents and practices, while 
maintaining a balance between the rights of the investors and the 
obligations of the Government.”40 Second, it is claimed that the Model BIT 
aims to make the treaty provisions more precise so as to minimise arbitral 
discretion.41  
A critical discussion of the Indian Model BIT is essential because the 
 
 38 See also Grant Hanessian & Kabir Duggal, The 2015 Indian Model BIT: Is This 
Change the World Wishes to See  30 ICSID Rev. — Foreign Inv. L.J. 729 (2015) [hereinafter 
Hanessian & Duggal, Is this the Change the World wishes to See (2015)]; Grant Hanessian & 
Kabir Duggal, The Final 2015 Indian Model BIT: Is This the Change the World Wishes to 
See, ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INV. L. J. (2017), doi:10.1093/icsidreview/siw020 [hereinafter, 
Hanessian & Duggal, Is this the Change the World wishes to See (2017)]; Aniruddha Rajput, 
India’s shifting treaty practice: a comparative analysis of the 2003 and 2015 Model BITs, 7 
JINDAL GLOB. L. REV. 201-226 (2016); KAVALJIT SINGH, An Analysis of India’s New Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES – CRITICAL 
ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 81-100 (Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Igle eds., 2016); Ashutosh 
Ray, Unveiled: Indian Model BIT, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (Jan. 18 2016), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/01/18/unveiled-indian-Model-bit/ (last visited, Feb, 1, 
2017); Amokura Kawharu & Luke R Nottage, Models for Investment Treaties in the Asian 
Region: An Underview, Arizona J. Intl. & Comp. L. (2017) (forthcoming); Ajay K. Sharma, 
A Good Offence Is Not Always the Best Defence: Critiquing the Standards of Protection 
under the 2015 Indian Model BIT  36 BUS. L. REV 203 (2015).  
 39 SAURABH GARG ET AL., The Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Continuity and 
Change RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES – CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY 
CHOICES 69-80, 71 (Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Igle eds., 2016); Department of Economic 
Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Transforming the International 
Investment Agreement Regime: The Indian Experience, http://unctad-
worldinvestmentforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/India_side-event-
Wednesday_Model-agreements.pdf. (India’s presentation in a Side Event at World 
Investment Forum 2016) [hereinafter, The Indian Experience].  
 40 See Government of India, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Department of Industrial 
Policy & Promotion, Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1290 (July 25, 2016),  
http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/9/AU1290.pdf (last visited, Aug. 8, 2017).  
 41 SAURABH GARG ET AL., supra note 39, at 76-77. For more on these reasons and 
justifications see Part II of the paper. The effort by India to minimize arbitral discretion can 
also been seen as an attempt to assert greater control over the investment treaty regime. On 
this, see generally–ANDREAS KULICK ed., REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT 
TREATY REGIME (2017). 
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new Model BIT “will be used for re-negotiation of existing BITs and 
negotiation of future BITs.”42 India’s modus operandi to renegotiate its 
existing BITs seems to be to first terminate the existing BITs, and then 
launch negotiation for new BITs based on the 2016 Model BIT.43 Both 
termination of BITs and launching negotiation for new BITs will impact as 
many as eighty-four countries with whom India has signed a BIT.44 India’s 
new Model BIT needs to be studied carefully because it will also impact 
ASEAN countries with whom India has recently signed an investment 
agreement;45 India’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partner countries, 
namely Singapore,46 Japan,47 Malaysia,48 and Korea,49 and also countries 
with whom India is currently negotiating a BIT such as Canada,50 and the 
United States (U.S.).51 India’s new Model BIT will also impact India’s 
 
 42 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, http://pib.nic.in/ 
newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133412 (last visited Jan 21, 2017). 
 43 Pramit Pal Chaudhary, India’s Bilateral Investment Treaties: Once BIT ten 57 times 
More Shy, http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/india-s-bilateral-investment-treaties-
once-bitten-57-times-more-shy/story-2d0VyByBuCC55TYz0zDzNK.html (last visited Mar. 
20, 2017).  
 44 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Navigator, India, http://investment 
policyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/96#iiaInnerMenu. Out of the 83 BITs signed by India, 
as of today, 57 are in force, 9 have not been enforced, and seventeen have been terminated. 
However, despite this termination, the treaty provisions shall continue to remain effective for 
investments made before the date of termination for a further period of 15 years - see India-
Netherlands BIT, art 16.1.  
 45 Agreement on Investment under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the 
Republic of India, Nov. 12, 2014 (yet to come into force). [hereinafter, ASEAN-India FTA]. 
 46 Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the Republic of India and 
the Republic of Singapore, Jun. 29, 2005, entered into force Aug. 1, 2005. [hereinafter, 
India-Singapore CECA]. 
 47 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between Japan and the Republic of 
India, Feb. 16, 2011, entered into force Aug. 1, 2011. [hereinafter, India-Japan CEPA]. 
 48 Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement between the Government of 
Malaysia and The Government of The Republic of India, Feb. 18, 2011, entered into force 
July 1, 2011. [hereinafter, India-Malaysia CECA]. 
 49 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the Republic of Korea and 
the Republic of India, Aug. 7, 2009, entered into force Jan. 1, 2010. [hereinafter, India-Korea 
CECA]. 
 50 Government of Canada, Canada-India Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement Negotiations, http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements 
-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/india-inde/fipa-apie/background-contexte.aspx?lang=eng  
(last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
 51 The U.S. and India have been negotiating a BIT since 2009. During President Barack 
Obama’s visit to India in 2015 with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and building further on 
past U.S.-India discussions, both presidents issued a Joint Statement ‘instruct[ing] their 
officials to assess the prospects for moving forward with high-standard bilateral 
investment treaty discussions given their respective approaches’ – see The White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary (Jan. 25 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
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negotiations on a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (RCEP) involving the ASEAN countries, Australia, China, 
Japan, Korea and New Zealand and cover trade and investment promotion 
and protection.52  
Furthermore, India is one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world,53 and the third most attractive destination for FDI, after China and 
the United States,54 which shows that a large number of foreign investors 
are interested in investing in India. In fact, total FDI flows to India, which 
increased from $4,029 million in 2000-2001 to $43,478 million in 2016-
17,55 show that large numbers of foreign investors are already present in 
India. Consequently, any change in India’s BIT practice is bound to impact 
a large number of foreign investors and their home states.56  
Given the significance of India’s approach to investment treaties, this 
paper will study the following key jurisdictional, substantive and dispute 
resolution provisions in the 2016 Model BIT: definition of investment (Part 
III); most favored nation (Part IV); fair and equitable treatment (Part V); 
full protection and security (Part VII); monetary transfer provisions (Part 
VIII); general exception clause (Part IX); other exceptions (Part X); and an 
ISDS provision (Part XI), from the standpoints of whether the Model BIT 
balances investment protection with state’s right to regulate and whether the 
 
press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-statement-shared-effort-progress-all (last visited Jan 
20, 2017) (hereinafter India-US Joint Statement 2015). On difficulties between US and India 
BIT negotiations see Prabhash Ranjan, BIT of a Bumpy Ride, THE HINDU (June 2, 2016), 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/Bit-of-a-bumpy-ride/article14378406.ece.  
 52 See Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating a Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/Documents/guiding-
principles-rcep.pdf. 
 53 According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), India’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) at market prices grew by 6.6 percent in 2016 only next to China where this number 
stands at 6.7 percent. Further, according to the IMF, India’s GDP in 2017 and 2018 is 
estimated to grow at 7.2 and 7.7 percent respectively, which is higher than China’s projected 
growth where these numbers stand at 6.5 and 6 percent respectively.  See International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), A Shifting Global Economic Landscape World Economic Outlook 
Update (January 2017), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/update/01/pdf/0117. 
pdf.  
 54 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 4. 
 55 Quarterly Fact Sheet, Fact Sheet on Foreign Direct Investment from April 2000 to 
March 2017, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, Government of India, http://dipp.nic.in/sites/default/files/FDI_FactSheet_January 
_March2017.pdf (last visited, Aug. 8, 2017). According to the Indian government, FDI 
inflows include equity inflows plus reinvested earnings plus other capital.  
 56 For instance, see Nayanima Basu & Amiti Sen, Absence of BIT may bite Swedish 
investments to India: Ann Linde, THE HINDU (May 18, 2017), http://www.thehindubusiness 
line.com/economy/absence-of-bit-may-bite-swedish-investments-to-india-ann-linde/article 
9707250.ece; Prabhash Ranjan, Turning the Clock Back, THE HINDU (Mar. 28, 2017), 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/turning-the-clock-back/article17684494.ece. 
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Model BIT is drafted in a manner that reduces arbitral discretion as claimed 
by the Indian government. Part XII concludes by noting that many 
provisions in the Indian Model BIT 2016 are tilted in favour of a host 
state’s right to regulate at the expense of investment protection. Also, many 
provisions are not precisely drafted and thus continue to grant a significant 
amount of discretion in the hands of arbitrators. As a subsidiary objective, 
the paper also contributes to the larger global debate on backlash against 
BITs and ISDS by showing that India, unlike the Latin American countries 
and South Africa, has not denounced the BIT and the ISDS system, but has 
diluted the system so as to greatly minimize the possibility of BIT claims to 
be brought against it. However, before we study the key features of the 
2016 Model BIT outlined above, understanding the background to the 
adoption of the new Model BIT is critical. 
II. BACKGROUND TO INDIA’S 2016 MODEL BIT 
India started signing BITs in the early 1990s as a part of its overall 
strategy of economic liberalization adopted in 1991, and had the clear 
objective of attracting foreign investments.57 India signed the first BIT with 
the United Kingdom in 1994.58 This BIT served as the template for India to 
negotiate further BITs.59 In fact, the Indian Model BIT of 200360 is very 
similar to the India-UK BIT. India’s BITs with these 84 countries, by and 
large, contain broad substantive provisions that could be interpreted in a 
manner that gives precedence to investment protection over a host state’s 
right to regulate.61 
 
 57 See Prabhash Ranjan, India and Bilateral Investment Treaties – A Changing 
Landscape 29 ICSID REV.- FOREIGN INV. L.J. 419 (2014) [hereinafter Ranjan, Changing 
Landscape]; Prabhash Ranjan, India’s International Investment Agreements and India’s 
Regulatory Power as a Host Nation (PhD thesis, King’s College London 2012), 
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/13524464/Studentthesis-Prabhash_Ranjan_2013.pdf 
[hereinafter, Ranjan, PhD Thesis], for a full discussion of India’s BIT program, including its 
origin and evolution; See also Niti Bhasin & Rinku Manocha, Do Bilateral Investment 
Treaties Promote FDI Inflows? Evidence from India, 41(4) VIKALPA: J. DECISION MAKERS 
275-287 (2016), (claiming that BITs signed by India have contributed to rising FDI inflows 
‘by providing protection and commitment to foreign investors contemplating investment in 
India); Luke Nottage & Jaivir Singh, Does ISDS Promote FDI? Asia-Pacific Insights from 
and for Australia and India, Asia Pacific Forum for International Arbitration (AFIA) (Nov. 
17, 2016), http://afia.asia/2016/11/does-isds-promote-fdi-asia-pacific-insights-from-and-for-
australia-and-india/. (last visited, Aug. 8, 2017). 
 58 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of India for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, Mar. 14, 1994, entered into force Jan. 6, 1995. [India-UK BIT]. 
 59 DEV KRISHAN, India and International Investment Law, INDIA AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 277 (Bimal Patel ed., 2008). 
 60 2003 Indian Model BIT, supra note 37.  
 61 See Ranjan, PhD Thesis, supra note 57; Government of India, Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, Rajya Sabha, Question No. 1122, Answered on Jul. 26, 2017, 
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Despite India’s mammoth BIT program, BITs in India did not attract 
much critical attention from 1994 to the end of 2011.62 This was mainly 
because of India’s marginal involvement with ISDS.63 In this period, 
although nine BIT cases were brought against India,64 they all pertained to 
just one project, the Dabhol power project,65 and none of these challenges 
resulted in an ISDS award though there were a couple of other arbitral 
awards.66 Thus, foreign investors did not challenge India’s regulatory 
measures as BIT violations, during the period from 1994 until 2010. This 
created the impression in the minds of policy makers in India that there is 
no need to study the close interface between BIT and India’s right to 
regulate.  
The lack of critical attention to BITs is evident from the following 
 
http://164.100.47.4/newrsquestion/ShowQn.aspx (last visited, Aug. 8, 2017).  
 62 Ranjan, Changing Landscape, supra note 57, at 436-38.   
 63 Ranjan, Changing Landscape, supra note 57. This is confirmed by three Indian 
government officials who recently wrote that “until the White Industries award, there had 
been little debate about the investment regime” in India.  SAURABH GARG ET AL., supra note 
39, at 71. It has been found that until countries are hit by BIT claims, it may be difficult for 
the country concerned to fully appreciate the cost of the BIT – Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen 
& Emma Aisbett, When Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational 
Learning 65:2 WORLD POL. (2013). 
 64 India – as Respondent State, Investment Policy Hub, UNCTAD http://investment 
policyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/96?partyRole=2. 
 65 The Dabhol Power Project was a foreign direct investment (FDI) project related to 
building an electrical power plant in India in early 1990s soon after the adoption of the 
liberalization program by India in 1991. Enron Corporation along with General Electric (GE) 
Corporation and Bechtel Enterprises formed a company called Dabhol Power Company 
(DPC) in Maharashtra (a western Indian state) to generate electrical power. DPC entered into 
an agreement with the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) a public-sector 
enterprise as the sole purchaser of the power generated by DPC. Subsequently, due to 
political opposition to the project on grounds of alleged irregularities and the high cost of 
power charged by DPC, MSEB cancelled the contract to purchase power leaving DPC 
without a consumer to sell electrical power and thus having a huge adverse impact on DPC’s 
business. Further, the central government of India, which acted as a counter guarantor, after 
making some payments, also declined to pay DPC for different reasons. DPC was restrained 
from starting an international arbitration by anti-arbitration injunctions issued by Indian 
courts.65The Mauritius based subsidiaries of GE and Bechtel, relying on the India-Mauritius 
BIT, challenged India’s measures including the judicial action of issuing anti-arbitration 
injunctions by courts as violation of the India Mauritius BIT. However, before an ISDS 
award could be issued a mutual settlement was reached. See, for detailed facts of the case, P. 
Kundra, Looking Beyond the Dabhol Debacle: Examining its Causes and Understanding its 
Lessons 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 908 (2008). Also see GE settles Dabhol Issue, THE 
INDIAN EXPRESS (Mumbai, July 3, 2005), http://www.indianexpress.com/oldStory/73760/. 
 66 Capital India Power Mauritius I and Energy Enterprises (Mauritius) Company v. 
India, ICC Case No. 12913/MS, Award, (Apr. 27, 2005); Bank of America, Memorandum of 
Determinations, OPIC, IIC 25 (2003), https://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/docs/Bankof 
America-September30-2003.pdf.  
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facts: barring some occasions, Indian Parliament rarely debated BITs;67 
there was dearth of academic literature on Indian BITs during this period;68 
and Indian BITs during this period were hardly debated in academic and 
policy circles within India.69  
Mapping India’s Backlash Against ISDS 
This lack of attention on BITs started to change from 2012 onwards 
due to three developments. The first development relates to India’s 
increased involvement with ISDS that came to light in 2011 and afterwards, 
in complete contrast to the period from 1994 to 2010. Towards the end of 
2011, the first publicly known BIT arbitral award was issued against India 
in a case known as White Industries v. India70 where an ISDS tribunal found 
that India violated its obligations under the India-Australia BIT71 (see Part 
III for more details on this case). After this award, a number of foreign 
corporations slapped ISDS notices against India, challenging a wide array 
of regulatory measures such as the imposition of retrospective taxes,72 
cancellation of spectrum licenses,73 revocation of telecom licenses,74 and 
 
 67 One such occasion was when P.K. Javadekar, Member of Parliament in Rajya Sabha 
(Upper House of the Parliament in India), asked the government to explain why India has 
entered into BITs.  See Rajya Sabha, List of Questions for written answers to be asked at a 
sitting of the Rajya Sabha to be held on Tuesday, April 20, 2010, Unstarred Question No. 
2615 (asked by Shri. Prakash Javadekar), http://164.100.47.5/EDAILYQUESTIONS/sess 
ionno/219/1552RS.pdf.  
 68 Some notable exceptions to this are: Sreenivasa Rao, Bilateral Investment Promotion 
Agreements: A Legal Framework for the Protection of Foreign Investments 26 
COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 623 (2000); KRISHAN, supra note 59; Prabhash Ranjan, 
International Investment Agreements and Regulatory Discretion: Case Study of India, 9 J. 
WORLD INV. & TRADE 209 (2008). 
 69 Ranjan, PhD Thesis, supra note 57. Similar arguments have also been made in context 
of China. It has been argued that while China has changed many of its laws due to WTO 
obligations, the Chinese BITs have not received equal attention. G. Wang, China’s Practice 
in International Investment Law: From Participation to Leadership in World Economy, 34 
YALE J. INT’L L. 575, 585-86 (2009). 
 70 White Industries Australia Limited v. Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award 
(Nov. 30, 2011). 
 71 Id. ¶ 16.1.1 (a).  
 72 Vodafone issued an arbitral notice to India under the India-Netherlands BIT for a 
retrospective taxation measure. See Vodafone v. India, UNCTIRAL, Notice of Arbitration 
(not public) (Apr. 17, 2014); Cairn Energy also dragged India to arbitration under the India-
UK BIT for a retrospective taxation measure. In this case, the arbitration tribunal has been 
constituted. See, Cairn Energy PLC v. India (UNCITRAL), http://investmentpolicyhub. 
unctad.org/ISDS/Details/691. 
 73 Germany’s Deutsche Telekom issued notice of arbitration to India under the India-
Germany BIT over a cancelation of a satellite venture. See Deutsche Telekom v. India, 
ICSID Additional Facility, Notice of Arbitration (not public) (Sept. 2, 2013). This 
cancellation of spectrum licenses also led Mauritian investors of Devas Multimedia, an 
Indian company, to challenge India’s regulatory actions under the India-Mauritius BIT at the 
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others.75    
The second development relates to demands in India to revisit BITs by 
different actors, such as academics, parliamentarians, and civil society 
organisations.76 In academia, few commentators demanded a critical 
assessment of India’s BITs much before the White Industries case.77 These 
demands became much stronger after that case and after issuance of ISDS 
notices against India as mentioned above.78 The biggest indicator of this is 
the swelling of the academic literature and writings on BITs in India post-
2011.79 Another indicator of greater attention that BITs have been receiving 
 
Permanent Court of Arbitration.  
CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited, and Telecom 
Devas Mauritius Limited v. Republic of India, PCA Case No 2013-09. Although the ISDS 
award has not been made public, reportedly, the tribunal has found India guilty of violating 
the expropriation and FET provisions of the India-Mauritius BIT [Antrix-Devas Deal: 
Permanent Court of Arbitration rules against Indian government, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Jul. 
27, 2016), http://indianexpress.com/article/business/business-others/antrix-devas-deal-
hague-international-tribunal-rules-against-indian-govt/.  
 74 Tenoch Holdings issued an arbitral notice against India under the India Russia and 
India-Cyprus BIT for withdrawal of approval to grant telecom licenses. See Tenoch Holdings 
Limited, Mr. Maxim Naumchenko & Mr. Andre Poluektov v. The Republic of India, PCA 
Case No. 2013-23.  
 75 Some other notices of arbitration include France’s Louis Dreyfus Armateurs’ (LDA’s) 
case against India under the India-France BIT challenging a series of measures adopted by 
the Indian government that allegedly prevented the implementation of a joint venture project 
to modernise the port in Haldia in Kolkata, India. See Louis Dreyfus Armateurs SAS v. The 
Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2014-26. An arbitration tribunal has also been constituted 
in this case. See also Strategic Infrasol Foodstuff LLC & The Joint Venture of Thakur Family 
Trust UAE with Ace Hospitality Management D.M.C.C. U.A.E. v. Republic of India, 
UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration (Oct. 8, 2015). 
 76 Prabhash Ranjan, Most Favoured Nation Principle in Indian Bilateral Investment 
Treaties: A Case for Reform, 55:1 INDIAN J. INT’L. L. 39–64 (2015) 
 77 See, e.g., Ranjan, supra note 68; Jayati Ghosh, Treacherous Treaties 27(24) 
FRONTLINE (2010).  
 78 See Prabhash Ranjan, Comparing Investment Provisions in India’s FTAs with India’s 
Stand Alone BITs: Contributing to the Evolution of New Indian BIT Practice, 16 J. WORLD 
INV. TRADE 899 (2015); Biswajit Dhar, Reji Joseph & James T.C., India’s Bilateral 
Investment Agreements: Time to Review 47:52 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 113 (2012); Smitha 
Francis & Murli Kallummal, India’s Comprehensive Trade Agreements: Implications for 
Development Trajectory 48:31 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 109 (2013). 
 79 See Ranjan, Changing Landscape, supra note 57; Ranjan, supra note 78; Ranjan, supra 
note 76; Dhar et al, supra note 78; Francis and Kallummal supra note 78; Rajput, supra note 
38; Hanessian & Duggal, Is this the Change the World wishes to See (2015), supra note 38; 
Hanessian & Duggal, Is this the Change the World wishes to See (2017), supra note 38; 
SAURABH GARG ET AL., supra note 39, at 69; SINGH, supra note 38, at 81; Nish Shetty and 
Romesh Weeramantary, India’s New Approach to Investment Treaties, 18:4 ASIAN DISP. 
REV. 189 (2016); Azernoosh Bazarafkan, The (R)evolution of Indian Model bilateral 
investment treaty: escaping liability without mitigating risks, 7:2 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 
245–261 (2016); Deepak Raju, General Exceptions in the Indian Model BIT: Is the 
‘necessity’ test workable?, 7:2 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 227-43 (2016). 
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after White Industries is this: in comparison to the period from 1994-2010, 
there has been a much more critical discussion on BITs in the Indian 
Parliament.80 This heightened concern for BITs was manifestly clear when 
the White Industries award was criticised in the Indian Parliament as “an 
attack on the sovereignty of the Indian Judiciary.”81 Similarly, civil society 
organizations, in the aftermath of White Industries and ISDS notices against 
India, are now demanding a review of India’s existing BIT program.82 They 
argue that the threat of BIT arbitrations “will have a chilling effect on the 
ability of different ministries (of the Indian government) to regulate 
different social and economic needs.”83 
The third development relates to the internal debate within the Indian 
government on BITs. The most important example of the emerging debate 
on BITs in India is the Ministry of Commerce’s discussion paper 
“International Investment Agreements Between India and Other 
Countries,”84 prepared in 2011—the same year when India lost the BIT case 
to White Industries. Inspired by the work of United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on BITs85 and developments in South 
 
 80 See Pinaki Misra, Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred Question No. 5870 on Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Parliament of India.  A Member of Parliament, in May 2012, asked the 
government to supply the details of all BITs that India had entered into and whether the texts 
of those BITs were publicly available. See also M S Reddy, Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred 
Question No. 3926 on Bilateral Investment Pacts, Parliament of India. Similarly, another 
Member of Parliament, in September 2012, asked the government whether any panel had 
been constituted to oversee the BIT disputes that had been brought against India. See also 
Bhola Singh, Lok Sabha Questions, Unstarred Question No. 4946 on Bilateral Investment 
Treaty, Parliament of India (16 December 2016). Questions in the Parliament have also been 
asked about whether India has entered into a BIT with the United States. 
 81 Statement by P. Rajeeve, Member of Parliament (India), Transcript of the Proceedings 
of the Rajyasabha (22 May 2012) 52-4, http://164.100.47.5/newdebate/225/22052012/ 
Fullday.pdf.  
 82 Forum against FDAs, We Call Upon the Government to Review and Rescind Its 
Decision to Sign BIT/ BIPA with the USA-Open letter to the Indian Prime Minister, Dr 
Manhoman Singh (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/lettter_forum_ag_ftas 
_us_india_bits_26_sept.pdf. 
 83 Santosh M.R., Concerns Regarding Proposed US-India Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(June 13, 2012), https://donttradeourlivesaway.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/civil-society-
letter-on-us-india-bit.pdf (letter written by many civil society organizations to the Indian 
Prime Minister expressing concerns about India’s BITs). 
 84 Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, International Investment Agreements 
between India and Other Countries (on file with author) [hereinafter, Commerce Ministry 
Paper]. The paper is not publicly available but was obtained by members of an NGO through 
India’s Right to Information Act 2005.  
 85 This is evident from the fact that the paper quotes various UNCTAD reports multiple 
times to support different arguments. See for UNCTAD’s work on BITs 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/Inte
rnational-Investment-Agreements-(IIAs).aspx. 
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Africa86 and Latin America,87 the paper recognised that “when developing 
countries enter into BITs, a balance between investors’ rights and domestic 
policy must be ensured.”88 The discussion paper also stated that “other 
legitimate public concerns must not be subordinated to investment 
protection issues.”89 It identified a number of areas of concern in Indian 
BITs such as an expansive definition of investment, an undefined fair and 
equitable treatment provision, a broad provision on expropriation without 
any reservations and exceptions, and a broad provision that allows investors 
to freely transfer funds.90 These broad and unqualified BIT provisions, 
according to the paper, could result in situations where India’s exercise of 
regulatory powers could be unduly compromised. For instance, the paper 
recognized that since the issuance of compulsory licenses for patented drugs 
was not excluded from the purview of expropriation, a patent holder could 
potentially file a BIT claim against India on this issue.91 The paper 
concluded that India should review its existing BITs and if, after review, it 
decides to continue with BITs, then foreign investors’ rights should be 
balanced with India’s regulatory power to act in furtherance of public 
purposes, such as the protection of health and environment.92 In the 
immediate aftermath of the White Industries case and after large numbers of 
foreign investors sued India under different BITs, some officials in the 
Indian government stated that India should renegotiate its BITs to drop the 
ISDS provision.93 Nevertheless, as we will see, the 2016 Model BIT has 
retained the ISDS mechanism though in a much-diluted form.   
The White Industries award and a spate of ISDS notices together, 
coupled with other developments mentioned above, resulted in a 
fundamental rethinking on BITs in India and paved the way for the review 
of BITs that began in 2012.94 This review process led to two important 
 
 86 See supra note 25; supra note 26. 
 87 See supra note 24.   
 88 Commerce Ministry Paper, supra note 84.  
 89 Id. at 17. 
 90 Id. at 60. 
 91 See, Commerce Ministry Paper, supra note 84. See also Prabhash Ranjan, Medical 
Patents and Expropriation in International Investment Law – with Special Reference to India 
5 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 72 (2008). This issue was raised by the first author of this 
article much before the Commerce Ministry Paper. 
 92 See Commerce Ministry Paper, supra note 84, at 21. 
 93 See Subhomoy Bhattacharjee, India seeks Treaty Revision to Deal with Corporate 
Suits, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Apr. 4, 2012), http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/india-
seeks-treaty-revisions-to-deal-with-corporate-suits/932195/.  See also SAURABH GARG ET 
AL., supra note 39, at 71-2.  
 94 See SAURABH GARG ET AL., supra note 39, at 71; The Indian Experience, supra note 
39. See also Statement by India at the World Investment Forum 2014, UNCTAD, 
http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Mayaram.pdf 
[hereinafter, India 2014 Statement]. 
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public admissions being made by the Indian government. First, the Indian 
government admitted, as also evident from the Commerce Ministry paper 
discussed above, that Indian BITs were not well-drafted because they 
contained broad and vague provisions that could be subjected to wide 
interpretations by ISDS tribunals.95 India’s 2014 statement during 
UNCTAD’S World Investment Forum specifically mentioned that the FET 
and MFN provisions in Indian BITs were vague.96 Specifically, India said 
that the MFN provision “has been expanded to include rights beyond what 
is granted by a treaty.”97 India’s concern about the broad interpretation of 
MFN provisions stems directly from the White Industries case98 discussed 
in Part IV of this paper. Second, India admitted that BITs containing broad 
and vague provisions were susceptible to broad and ambiguous provisions 
and could encroach upon the host state’s regulatory powers.99 Specifically, 
on the basis of the White Industries award and other ISDS notices served on 
India as discussed before, India said that the “current investment treaty 
regime . . . can be viewed as unfair for State’s in the exercise of their 
regulatory power.”100  
The review process launched in 2012 led to three outcomes: first, the 
adoption of the Model BIT on January 14, 2016.101 This adoption was 
preceded, by the circulation of the draft version of the Model BIT in March 
2015102 for comments.103 The draft Model BIT attracted considerable 
 
 95 The Indian Experience, supra note 39; Government of India, supra note 61; SAURABH 
GARG ET AL., supra note 39, at 76–77. The first author of this article has consistently argued 
that Indian BITs contain broad and vague provisions that could be subject to very different 
interpretations depending on the discretion exercised by ISDS tribunals. See Ranjan, PhD 
Thesis, supra note 57; Ranjan, Changing Landscape, supra note 57; see also Henckels, 
supra note 30, who argues that “international investment treaties . . . typically contain 
broadly worded, open-textured obligations that do not address the relationship between 
investment protection and the continuing powers of host states to regulate. These provisions 
give investment tribunals significant discretion in interpreting state’s obligations towards 
foreign investors and investments.”   
 96 India 2014 Statement, supra note 94. 
 97 India 2014 Statement, supra note 94. The FET provision in a large number of Indian 
BITs does not provide any normative content and therefore is subject to wide interpretations. 
See Ranjan, PhD Thesis, supra note 57. See also the discussion in Part IV of the paper.   
 98 See White Industries, supra note 70.  
 99 Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Rajya Sabha, Question No 
1122, 26 July 2017, http://164.100.47.5/qsearch/QResult.aspx; India 2014 Statement, supra 
note 94; The Indian Experience, supra note 39.  
 100India 2014 Statement, supra note 94; see also Ranjan, PhD Thesis, supra note 57; 
Ranjan, Changing Landscape, supra note 57.  
 101See supra note 36. 
 102Draft Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20In
dian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf [hereinafter, 2015 Draft Indian Model BIT]. 
 103Comments on the 2015 Draft Indian Model BIT, https://www.mygov.in/group-
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attention104 including a full report from the Law Commission of India.105 
Second, subsequent to the adoption of the 2016 Model BIT, India issued 
notices of BIT termination to 58 countries106 as mentioned before. The 
reason behind terminating these treaties was to negotiate new BITs based 
on the 2016 Model BIT.107 Third, India has requested twenty-five of its BIT 
partner countries to issue joint interpretative statements in order to resolve, 
what India describes as ‘uncertainties and ambiguities that may arise 
regarding interpretation and application of the standards contained, in 
India’s BITs.108 If these joint interpretative statements are finalized, India 
expects that they would become an important element in the process of 
treaty interpretation.109 There is no information available as to how many 
 
issue/draft-indian-Model-bilateral-investment-treaty-text/.  
 104See Hanessian & Duggal, Is this the Change the World wishes to See (2015), supra 
note 38; Mahdev Mohan, Asian Perspectives on Investment and Arbitration: An Evolving 
Marcottage, YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY (Andrea 
Bjorklund ed., 2017); Lise Jhonson, Lisa Sachs & Sudhanshu Roy, Next Generation Treaty, 
THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Nov. 12, 2015), 
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/best-investment-treaty/; Ranjan, 
Comparing India’s FTA and BITs, supra note 78; Prabhash Ranjan, A BIT of an 
Overreaction, THE FIN. EXPRESS, (April 4, 2015), 
http://www.financialexpress.com/article/fe-columnist/column-a-bit-of-an-
overreaction/60348/. 
 105Government of India, Law Commission of India, Report No 260, Analysis of the Draft 
Model Indian Bilateral Investment (August 2015), 
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/Report260.pdf. See also Government of India, 
Ministry of Finance, Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question Number 2635, 22 December 2015 
http://164.100.47.5/qsearch/QResult.aspx. A question was also asked about the Law 
Commission Report on the Model BIT in the Indian Parliament. 
 106See supra note 40; however, the Indian government has not revealed which are these 
BITs i.e. with which countries. UNCTAD’s International Investment Agreements (IIAs) 
database states that India has terminated BITs with these 15 countries: Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, Oman, Switzerland, and Spain. See India Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITS), 
UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/ 
CountryBits/96#iiaInnerMenu (last visited, Aug. 8, 2017).  
 107Asit Ranjan Mishra, India to Trade Partners: Sign new bilateral investment treaties by 
31 March, LIVE MINT (Jan. 11 2017), http://www.livemint.com/Politics/8IRq2uiGhDAxjyi 
O2lEJ3K/India-asks-trade-partners-to-sign-new-BIT-pact.html.  
 108Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, Office 
Memorandum -  Regarding Issuing Joint Interpretative Statements for Indian Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, (Feb. 8, 2016), http://indiainbusiness.nic.in/newdesign/upload/ 
Consolidated_Interpretive-Statement.pdf. [hereinafter, Consolidated Interpretative 
Statement]. 
 109Id. In this context also see Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 1969, arts. 31(3)(a) 
and 31(3)(b) May 23, 1969, 155 UNTS 331: “There shall be taken into account, together 
with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any instrument which was 
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by 
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countries have responded to this request except Bangladesh.110 
After having understood the global debate on the backlash against 
BITs and ISDS mechanism and discussed the background to the adoption of 
the 2016 Model BIT, the paper now turns to studying the important features 
of India’s 2016 Model BIT as delineated before.   
III. DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT 
The BIT definition of ‘investment’ plays an important role in 
determining the scope of rights and obligations under the treaty and the 
establishment of the ISDS tribunal jurisdiction.111 Most Indian BITs provide 
a broad asset-based definition of ‘investment’ where every kind of asset 
with economic value established or acquired by the foreign investor is an 
investment.112 In the 2016 Model BIT, India moved away from a broad 
 
the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty; (c) Any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties.” See also, MARK VILLIGER, 
COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2009); OLIVER 
DÖRR & KIRSTEN SCHMALENBACH, VIENNA CONVENTION ON LAW OF TREATIES: A 
COMMENTARY (2012); See also, Hervé Ascensio, Article 31 of the Vienna Conventions on 
the Law of Treaties and International Investment Law, 31:2 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INV. L.J. 
366-87 (2016). Issuing such joint interpretative statements is clearly an attempt to reassert 
control over investment treaty regime – on this see generally ELENI METHYMAKI & 
ANTONIOS TZANAKOPOULOS, ‘Masters of Puppets? Reassertion of Control through Joint 
Investment Treaty Interpretation’ in REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT 
TREATY REGIME (Andreas Kulick ed. 2017). 
 110Jarrod Hepburn, Unable to Unilaterally Terminate a 2011 BIT, The Government of 
India Persuades Counter-Party to Agree Joint Interpretive Note to Clarify BIT’s 
Implications, IA REPORTER (Jul. 17, 2017) https://www.iareporter.com/articles/unable-to-
unilaterally-terminate-a-2011-bit-the-government-of-india-persuades-counter-party-to-agree-
joint-interpretive-note-to-clarify-bits-implications/. 
 111On definition of investment in BITs see generally International Investment Law: 
Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations, OECD (2008); On definition of 
investment, see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 60-78; SALACUSE, supra note 1, 
at 166-86; Mavluda Sattorova, Defining Investment under the ICSID Convention and BITs: 
Of Ordinary Meaning, Telos, and Beyond, 2:2 ASIAN J. INT. L. 267 (2012); Julian Davis 
Mortenson, The Meaning of Investment: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International 
Investment Law, 51:1 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 257 (2010); Rajput, supra note 38, at 208; 
Hanessian & Duggal, Is this the Change the World wishes to See (2017), supra note 38, at 2-
3. 
 112See, for instance 2003 Indian Model BIT, supra note 37, art 1(b) provides: 
“‘[I]nvestment’ means every kind of asset established or acquired including changes in the 
form of such investment, in accordance with the national laws of the Contracting Party in 
whose territory the investment is made and in particular, though not exclusively, includes: (i) 
movable and immovable property as well as other rights such as mortgages, liens or pledge 
(ii) shares in and stock and debentures of a company and any other similar forms of 
participation in a company; (iii) rights to money or to any performance under contract having 
a financial value; (iv) intellectual property rights, in accordance with the relevant laws of the 
respective Contracting Party; (v) business concessions conferred by law or under contract, 
including concessions to search for and extract oil and other minerals.”  
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asset-based definition of investment to an enterprise-based definition where 
an enterprise is taken together with its assets.113 Therefore, only an 
enterprise that is legally constituted in India can bring a BIT claim.114 
Moving away from an asset-based approach to an enterprise-based 
approach aims at narrowing the scope of investments to be protected and 
thus seeks to reduce the number of BIT claims that can be brought against 
India.115 
In the 2016 Model BIT, investment means an enterprise that has been 
constituted, organized, and operated in good faith by an investor in 
accordance with the domestic laws of the country.116 Article 1.4 also 
provides a non-exhaustive list of assets that an enterprise may possess.117 
Further, the enterprise must satisfy certain characteristics of investment 
such as commitment of capital and other resources, duration, the 
expectation of gain or profit, and the assumption of risk and significance for 
the development of the country where the investment is made.118 From 
Article 1.4 it is not clear whether the characteristics of investment are to be 
satisfied just by an enterprise or by its assets. This can be understood with 
 
 113See 2016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art 1.4 provides: “‘Investment’ means an 
enterprise constituted, organized and operated in good faith by an investor in accordance 
with the law of the Party in whose territory the investment is made, taken together with the 
assets of the enterprise, has the characteristics of an investment such as the commitment of 
capital or other resources, certain duration, the expectation of gain or profit, the assumption 
of risk and a significance for the development of the Party in whose territory the investment 
is made….” 
 114Id. art. 1.3 provides: “[E]nterprise means: (i) any legal entity constituted, organized 
and operated in compliance with the law of a Party, including any company, corporation, 
limited liability partnership or a joint venture; and (ii) a branch of any such entity established 
in the territory of a Party in accordance with its law and carrying out business activities 
there.” 
 115Srikar Mysore & Aditya Vora, Tussle for Policy Space in International Investment 
Norm Setting: The Search for a Middle Path? 7 JINDAL GLOB. L. REV. 135, 143 (2016).  
 1162016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art 1.4.  
 117Id. art. 1.4 (a) to (h).  
 118The inclusion of these characteristics is clearly influenced by certain cases such as 
Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 23, 2001); Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2004); Jan 
de Nul N.V. and Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/13, Award (Nov. 6, 2008); Investment chapters in India’s FTAs include the 
‘characteristics test’ for assets. See Indian -Japan CEPA, supra note 47, art 3(i); India-
Malaysia CECA, supra note 48, art 10.2(d); India-Korea CECA, supra note 49, art 10.1; 
India-Singapore CECA, supra note 46, art 6.1(1). However, these investment chapters only 
include the following three criteria: ‘the commitment of capital or other resources’, ‘the 
expectation of gain or profit’, and ‘the assumption of risk for the investor’ and not 
‘contribution to host State’s economic development’. On the ‘characteristics test’, see 
generally NOAH RUBINS, The Notion of Investment in International Investment Arbitration, 
ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 283 (2004).  
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the help of the following example: Let us assume that a foreign 
pharmaceutical enterprise, legally constituted in India for the last 10 years, 
gets a patent on a drug. After, say, just six months from the granting of the 
patent, the Indian government revokes the patent for some reason, and the 
enterprise wishes to challenge before an arbitral tribunal. Here, will the 
“characteristics test” of investment be required to be satisfied by the asset 
(patent right), the enterprise, or both? If it is the patent right, then it might 
be difficult to satisfy the “characteristics test” due to the short duration for 
which the asset has been in existence. If, on the other hand, the 
“characteristics test” has to be satisfied by the enterprise, it would be easier 
to fall under the definition of investment and the short duration for which 
the patent right has been in existence will not matter. 
The definition of investment is also not clear on the actual meaning of 
the characteristics that an enterprise or asset is expected to possess. For 
instance, the definition does not specify how long the enterprise should be 
in existence and thus leaves this determination to the discretion of an ISDS 
tribunal. Similarly, there is no guidance available in the text to determine 
whether an investment has ‘significance for the development’ of the country 
to be eligible for treaty protection, which gives discretion to ISDS 
tribunals.119 It is argued that this requirement was inserted into the Model 
BIT to ensure that assets that do not contribute to the development of the 
host country do not enjoy treaty protection.120 However, as the tribunal in 
LESI SpA v. Algeria held, it is difficult to ascertain whether an investment 
has contributed to the development of the host state.121 For instance, it is not 
clear how sizeable or successful the investment should be to conclude that it 
has contributed to the development of the host state.122 While some 
 
 119DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 75 for example, states that the requirement that 
an asset qualifies as investment only if it makes a contribution to the development of the host 
State is ‘the most controversial criterion’. This is evident from the fact that while some 
tribunals have included the ‘development to host country’ criterion in their assessment in 
determining whether an investment has taken place. See Salini, supra note 118; Joy Mining, 
supra note 118; Some have not some have not considered the criterion important in making 
such determination. See Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, 
Award (July 14, 2010); Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Found v. Republic of 
Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Award, ¶ 232 (May 8, 2008); LESI SpA et Astaldi SpA v. 
Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 12, 2006) [hereinafter 
LESI]; Quiborax S.A., Non-Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Bolivia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction (Sept. 27, 2012); See also Alex Grabowski, 
The Definition of Investment Under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of Salini, 15 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 287 (2014). 
 120SAURABH GARG ET AL., supra note 39, at 84. On broad asset based definitions of 
foreign investment allowing for a large range of transactions to enjoy protection under the 
BIT see UNCTAD, SCOPE AND DEFINITION - UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II 9 (2011), 9.   
 121LESI, supra note 119, at ¶ 72(iv).  
 122See Mr. Patrick Mitchell v. The Democratic Republic of Congo, ICSID Case No. 
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tribunals suggest that it is enough if the investment contributes in one way 
or another,123 other tribunals have held that this contribution should be 
“significant.”124 What are the benchmarks against which the “significance” 
of contribution is measured? Leaving such difficult questions for an ISDS 
tribunal to decide is the exact opposite of reducing arbitral discretion. 
Moreover, including this criterion to determine whether an investment has 
been made would also mean, as the Annulment Committee held in 
Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia,125 that investments making 
“small contributions, and contributions of a cultural and historical nature” 
shall not get treaty protection.126 It tilts the balance in favor of the host state 
because treaty protection could be denied to foreign investments despite 
being lawful and despite making a commitment of capital or other resources 
on the subjective ground that it is not significant for the development of the 
host state.   
IV. MOST FAVORED NATION TREATMENT 
The most favored nation (MFN) provision in BITs aims to create a 
level-playing field for all foreign investors by prohibiting the host state 
from discriminating against investors from different countries.127 The actual 
working of an MFN clause in a BIT can be understood with this simple 
illustration as discussed by Schill.128 Let us assume three states: A (the 
granting state), B (the beneficiary state) and C (the third state). Further, 
assume that states A and B have entered into a treaty containing an MFN 
clause (primary treaty). Now, If state A extends certain benefits to state C, 
state B can invoke the MFN clause in the primary treaty to ensure that state 
A extends the same benefits to it provided the granted benefits to state C 
fall within the scope of application of the MFN clause contained in the 
primary treaty between A and B.129 In ISDS claims, foreign investors have 
 
ARB/99/7, Annulment proceeding, ¶ 33 (Feb. 9, 2004). 
 123Id. 
 124Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No ARB/05/10, Award on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 124 (May 17, 2007). 
 125Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on 
the Application for Annulment (Apr. 16, 2009). 
 126Id. ¶ 80 (b). 
 127OECD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law, OECD 
Working Papers on International Investment 2004/02, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/ 
investment-policy/WP-2004_2.pdf; Okezic Chukwumerije, Interpreting Most-Favoured-
Nation Clauses in Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 597, 608 
(2007); Jürgen Kurtz, The MFN Standard and Foreign Investment: An Uneasy Fit, 5 J. 
WORLD INV. & TRADE 861, 873 (2004). 
 128STEPHAN W. SCHILL, MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 140 
(2009). 
 129SCHILL, supra note 128 at 126; ENDRE USTOR, Most Favoured Nation Clause, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOLUME III 468 (Rudolf Bernhardt & Peter 
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often used the MFN provision of the primary BIT (under which the dispute 
between investor and state arises) successfully to borrow a favorable 
substantive provision granted by the host state under another BIT 
(secondary BIT).130 Foreign investors have also relied upon the MFN 
provision in the primary BIT to borrow beneficial ISDS provisions from 
secondary BITs131 with varying degrees of success.132  
An important case on a MFN provision involving India is White 
Industries v. India,133 which has already been elaborately discussed 
elsewhere,134 and will be discussed here briefly. In that case, an Australian 
 
Macalister-Smith eds., 1997). See also Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of its Thirtieth Session 8 May-28, U.N. Doc. A/33/10 (1978), reprinted in 2 Y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n (1978).  
 130See, Vladimir Berschader and Moïse Berschader v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case 
No. 080/2004, Award, ¶ 179 (Apr. 21, 2006); Asian Agricultural Products v Sri Lanka, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, ¶ 54 (June 27, 1990) [hereinafter AAPL]. Although 
in this case, the investor could not succeed because of being unable to show that Sri Lanka’s 
BIT with Switzerland contained a more beneficial provision. See ¶ 54; MTD Equity v. 
Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Award (May 25, 2004) [hereinafter, MTD]; 
Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.Ş v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case 
No ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction (Nov. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Bayindir]; Also see 
Rumeli Telekom v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No ARB/05/16, Award, ¶¶ 572, 575 
(July 29, 2008); Pope and Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award 
on the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2001) [hereinafter, Pope and Talbot, Award on Merits]; 
See also SCHILL, supra note 128.  
 131See Rudolf Dolzer & Terry Myers, After Tecmed: Most Favoured Nation Clauses in 
International Investment Protection Agreements, 19 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L. J. 49 
(2004); Stephen Fietta, Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution under 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Turning Point? 8 INT’L. ARB. L. REV. 131 (2005); Dana H. 
Freyer & David Herlihy, Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Settlement in 
Investment Arbitration, 20 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L. J. 58 (2005); Locknie Hsu, MFN and 
Dispute Settlement, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 25 (2006); Kurtz, supra note 127; SCHILL, 
supra note 128, at 151-72; ABBY COHEN SMUTNY & LEE A. STEVEN, The MFN Clause: What 
are its Limits?, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 351 (K. 
Yannaca-Small ed., 2010); Martins Paparinskis, MFN Clauses and International Dispute 
Settlement: Moving beyond Mafezzini and Plama?, 26 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L. J. 14 
(2011).  
 132See, Emilio Augustine Mafezzini v. Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, Award, (Nov. 
13, 2000); Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 108 (Aug. 3, 2004); Gas Natural v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction, ¶ 49 (Jun. 17, 2005); 
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. & Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 59 (Aug. 3, 2006); Also 
see, Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, 
Award, ¶¶ 159-60 (Dec. 8, 2008).  
 133White Industries, supra note 70. 
 134See Prabhash Ranjan, The White Industries Arbitration: Implications for India’s 
Investment Treaty Programme, INV. TREATY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/ 
2012/04/13/the-white-industries-arbitration-implications-for-indias-investment-treaty-
program/; Manu Sanan, The White Industries Award: Shades of Grey 13 J. WORLD INV. & 
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investor, relying on the MFN provision of the India-Australia BIT (the 
primary treaty), argued for the importation of a favorable substantive 
provision related to “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing 
rights” given in the India-Kuwait BIT (second treaty) into the India-
Australia BIT.135 The MFN provision in the India-Australia BIT is as 
follows: “A Contracting Party shall at all times treat investments in its own 
territory on a basis no less favourable than that accorded to investments or 
investors of any third country.”136  
India argued such importation would ‘fundamentally subvert the 
carefully negotiated balance of the BIT.’137 However, the tribunal did not 
agree with India and allowed for the importation of the substantive 
provision from the secondary BIT into the primary BIT.138 The tribunal held 
that an importation of the substantive provision into the primary BIT served 
the purpose for which countries have incorporated the MFN provision in the 
BIT.139 Post this setback, India took the stand that the use of the MFN 
provision by foreign investors to borrow beneficial substantive and 
procedural provisions from third country BITs in order to replace or 
supplement the provisions of the primary BIT, disturbs the various 
strategic, diplomatic, and political reasons behind negotiating bilateral 
treaties.140 In order to ensure that there is no repeat of a White Industries 
situation, the Indian Model BIT does not include an MFN provision.141  
However, not having an MFN provision in the BIT will expose foreign 
investment to the risk of discriminatory treatment by the host state at two 
levels. First, the host state could offer preferential treatment to the foreign 
investor under one BIT without providing the same treatment to another 
foreign investor under another. Here is a simple example to illustrate this: 
Assume the BIT between countries A and B does not contain a FET 
provision whereas the BIT between countries B and C does. Absence of an 
MFN provision in the A-B BIT would mean that while investors from C can 
enjoy FET protection in country B, country A’s investors will not be able to 
borrow the FET protection into the A-B BIT and thus not enjoy FET 
protection in country B. Second, the host state could offer preferential 
 
TRADE 661 (2012). 
 135White Industries, supra note 70, at ¶¶ 11.1.1 - 11.1.5. For more details on this case, see 
Ranjan, supra note 134; Sanan, supra note 134. 
 136Agreement between the Government of the Australia and the Government of the 
Republic of India on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Feb. 26, 1999, entered 
into force May 4, 2000 [India-Australia BIT] art 4.2.  
 137White Industries, supra note 70, at ¶ 11.2.1.  
 138Id. ¶¶ 11.2.2 - 11.2.8; See also Bayindir supra note 130; MTD supra note 130. 
 139Id. ¶ 11.2.4; See also U.N. Commission, Draft Articles on Most Favoured Nation 
Clauses with commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1 (1979). 
 140India 2014 Statement, supra note 94; SAURABH GARG ET AL., supra note 39, at 75-76.  
 141SAURABH GARG ET AL., supra note 39, at 76.   
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treatment to foreign investors from one country and not offer the same 
treatment to foreign investors from another country in the application of 
domestic measures or regulations. For example, country B offers tax 
incentives to country C’s investors and not to country A’s investors. 
Absence of a MFN provision in the A-B BIT would mean that investors 
from country A cannot ask for the same tax concessions from country B. It 
is clear that India’s concerns about MFN stems from the situation discussed 
before. This concern could have been addressed by limiting the scope of the 
MFN treatment in the BIT. The EU-Canada CETA142 shows how this can 
be done. Article 8.7(1) of the EU-Canada CETA contains the MFN 
provision, which puts both sides under an obligation not to accord treatment 
less favorable to a foreign investor than that accorded in like situations to 
investors of a third country with respect to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, conduct, etc. This clearly means that host states cannot 
discriminate between foreign investors in the application of domestic 
regulatory measures, similar to the second situation discussed above. In 
order to limit the scope of the MFN provision so as to exclude first situation 
discussed above, Article 8.7(4) states that “treatment” referred to in Article 
8.4(1) does not include “procedures for the resolution of investment 
disputes between investors and states provided for in other international 
investment treaties” and that substantive obligations in other international 
investment treaties and other trade agreements do not in themselves 
constitute ‘treatment’; thus, they cannot give rise to a breach of this Article 
[MFN] unless a host state has adopted or maintained measures pursuant to 
those obligations.143 This clarification makes it very clear that investors 
cannot use the MFN provision to borrow beneficial procedural provisions 
or beneficial substantive provisions from a third country BIT unless it can 
be shown that the host state has adopted or is maintaining a domestic 
measure in accordance with some substantive provision given in the BIT. 
India should have followed this approach 144 and not done away with the 
MFN provision completely, exposing foreign investors to discriminatory 
treatment and tilting the balance in favour of the host state’s regulatory 
power. 
V. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 
FET has emerged as the most important standard of treatment in 
BITs145 and has attracted considerable scholarly attention.146 Numerous 
 
 142Canada-EU CETA, supra note 31. 
 143Id. art. 8.7(4). 
 144Ranjan, supra note 76; see also UNCTAD, MOST FAVOURED NATION TREATMENT, 
UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II 107 (2010). 
 145NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 1, at 254; SALACUSE, supra note 1, at 219 
(describing FET as the grundnorm or basic norm of the investment treaty system).  
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ISDS claims show that FET has become a catch-all provision capable of 
sanctioning many legislative, regulatory, and administrative actions of the 
host state.147 One major reason for FET becoming a catch-all provision is 
because it often occurs in a large number of BITs148 without much guidance 
about its normative content.149 This has given rise to a debate regarding the 
meaning of the FET provision.150 According to one view, FET merely refers 
to the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens 
(hereinafter IMS).151 The basic premise of IMS is that “an alien is protected 
against unacceptable measures of the host state by rules of international law 
which are independent of those of the host state.”152 The argument that FET 
refers to IMS is strong in those BITs that link FET to customary 
international law.153 However, even in such BITs, the debate regarding the 
 
 146SALACUSE, supra note 1; VANDEVELDE, supra note 16, at 43.  
 147SURYA PRASAD SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 172-73 (2008); See, Pope 
and Talbot, Award on Merits, supra note 130, at ¶ 110; Mondev International Ltd. v. United 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2, Award (Oct.11, 2002); Merrill and Ring Forestry 
L.P. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, Award (Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter, Merrill 
and Ring]; Teco v. Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, Award, ¶ 454 (Dec. 19, 2013); 
Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 442-44 
(Mar. 17, 2015). See also VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra note 12, at 
89. 
 148NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 1, at 254 (2009).  See also M.C. Porterfield, An 
International Common Law of Investors Rights, 27 U. PENN. J. INT’L. L. 99 (2014).   
 149Scholars have described FET as wide, tenuous and imprecise. See M. SORNARAJAH, 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 332 (2004); Vaughan Lowe, Regulation 
or Expropriation, 55 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 447 (2002); Christoph Schreuer, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 364 (2005); SALACUSE, 
supra note 1, at 241; VANDEVELDE, supra note 16, at 69.   
 150SALACUSE, supra note 1, at 245. 
 151Id.  
 152DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 3; see E. Root, The Basis of Protection to 
Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 AM. J. INT’L. L. 521 (1910). On FET and international minimum 
standard, see generally MARTINS PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD 
AND FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT (2013). 
 153For example, Article 10.4 (1) of the investment chapter of India-Korea FTA states: 
“Each Party shall accord to an investment of an investor of the other Party in its territory 
“fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security.” The concepts of “fair and 
equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to 
or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens[.]” See also Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. 
The Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2 Award (Jun. 25, 2011); Occidental, 
supra note 9; Interpretative Note to the art. 1105 NAFTA: “Minimum Standard of Treatment 
in Accordance with International Law (1) Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of 
treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party. (2) The concepts of 
“fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in 
addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens. (3) A determination that there has been a breach of another 
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content of IMS persists. Whether this content should be determined by 
reference to the 1926 case, Neer v. Mexico,154 a case that did not concern 
investment but the murder of the U.S. citizen in Mexico, where U.S.-
Mexico General Claims Commission said that for treatment of an alien to 
constitute an international delinquency it “should amount to an outrage, to 
bad faith, to willful neglect of duty or to an insufficiency of action so far 
short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man 
would readily recognize its insufficiency” (hereinafter Neer standard).155 
Some ISDS tribunals, like the tribunal in Glamis Gold v. United States,156 
held that the Neer standard of 1926 continues to reflect the IMS.157 On the 
other hand, other tribunals have held that the IMS is not frozen in time and 
is “constantly in a process of development”158 and thus, barring for cases 
pertaining to safety and due process, “today’s minimum standard is broader 
than that defined in the Neer case and its progeny.”159 This clearly shows 
that even in BITs where FET is linked to the customary international law 
standard, there is no consensus regarding the meaning of this standard 
especially in the context of judging a host State’s regulatory behaviour,160 
and thus the determination of the actual content of the standard depends on 
arbitral discretion.  
The other view on FET is that its meaning is not restricted to the IMS, 
but is broader and autonomous.161 This view is particularly strong in those 
BITs where the FET provision appears as an autonomous standard, i.e. 
without it being linked to the customary international law standard.162  
 
provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that 
there has been a breach of Article 1105(1).” 
 154LFH Neer and Pauline Neer (USA) v. United Mexican States, 4 UNRIAA 60. 
 155Id.; see also Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 ICJ REP. 15. 
[hereinafter, ELSI]  
 156Glamis Gold v. The United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 614 (Jun. 8, 
2009). 
 157Id. ¶ 598–627.  
 158ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/1, Award, 
¶ 179 (Jan. 9, 2003); see also Merrill and Ring, supra note 147, at ¶¶ 205–11; see also Gold 
Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, ¶ 
567 (Sept. 22, 2014).   
 159See ADF, ¶ 113; Merrill and Ring supra note 147, at ¶ 213; see also Int’l Thunderbird 
Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Arbitral Award, ¶ 193 (Jan. 26, 2006) 
[hereinafter, Thunderbird]; ROLAND KLAGER, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 48–61 (2011).  
 160Henckels, supra note 30, at 36; W. Michael Reisman, Canute Confronts the Tide: 
States versus Tribunals and the Evolution of the Minimum Standard in Customary 
International Law, 30 ICSID REVIEW. – FOREIGN INV. L. J. 616 (2015).   
 161DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 134.  
 162For example, 2003 Indian Model BIT, supra note 37, art. 3 (2) provides the FET 
provision as, “Investments and returns of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all 
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment in the territory of the other Contracting 
RANJAN_JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2017  4:10 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 38:1 (2017) 
28 
However, the autonomous standard provides no guidance as to how to find 
the content of the FET provision, which, in turn, provides unfettered 
adjudicative discretion to ISDS tribunals to supply content to the FET 
provision.163  
Interestingly, the 2016 Model BIT does not contain a FET provision.164 
India decided not to include a provision on FET because ISDS tribunals 
often interpret this provision too broadly.165 Instead, the Model BIT 
contains a provision entitled ‘Treatment of Investments.’166 As part of this, 
Article 3.1 prohibits a country from subjecting foreign investments to 
measures that constitute a violation of customary international law through:  
1) denial of justice, which covers both judicial and administrative 
proceedings; or,  
2) fundamental breach of due process; or,  
3) targeted discrimination on manifestly unjustified grounds such as 
gender, race or religious belief; or,  
4) manifestly abusive treatment such as coercion, duress, and 
harassment.167  
This is clearly an attempt to provide normative content to the IMS 
without making any reference to the FET provision. This content, distinct 
even from the standard formulated under the 1926 Neer award,168 is also an 
attempt to reject the evolution of the IMS, which ISDS tribunals have 
elaborated upon as mentioned earlier. For example, North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tribunals, while dealing with IMS, have 
embraced the concept of legitimate expectations.169 The tribunal in Glamis 
 
Party.” There is no reference to customary international law. See generally SALACUSE, supra 
note 1, at 249–51; F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 241, 244 (1981).  
 163SALACUSE, supra note 1, at 251.  
 164See Rajput, supra note 38.  
 165India’s 2014 Statement, supra note 94.  
 166See 2016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art. 3. 
 167Id. art. 3.1 provides: “No Party shall subject investments made by investors of the 
other Party to measures which constitute a violation of customary international law through: 
(i) Denial of justice in any judicial or administrative proceedings; or (ii) fundamental breach 
of due process; or (iii) targeted discrimination on manifestly unjustified grounds, such as 
gender, race or religious belief; or (iv) manifestly abusive treatment, such as coercion, duress 
and harassment.” 
 168Hanessian & Duggal, Is this the Change the World wishes to See (2015), supra note 
38.  
 169See, Thunderbird supra note 159, at ¶ 147; Glamis Gold, supra note 156, at ¶ 621; 
Bilcon v Mexico, UNCITRAL, (NAFTA), PCA Case No 2009-04, ¶ 455. 
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Gold v. USA stated that legitimate expectations170 relate to an examination 
under Article 1105(1) in such situations where a host state’s conduct 
“creates reasonable and justifiable expectations on the part of an investor 
(or investment) to act in reliance on said conduct.”171 By not specifically 
including legitimate expectations as part of the IMS, India clearly wishes to 
distance itself from the large body of arbitral case law that includes 
legitimate expectations as part of the IMS. While it is true that some ISDS 
tribunals have given a very expansive meaning to legitimate expectations, 
heavily tilted in favor of foreign investment,172 some tribunals like Glamis 
v. Mexico, as mentioned before, have narrowed it down to situations where 
a host state induces an investor to make an investment by making specific 
representations to the investor, which investor relies upon to make the 
investment, and then the host state frustrates the representation made.173 
Legitimate expectations worded in this narrower form would place 
constraints upon the discretion of ISDS tribunals174 and, simultaneously, 
also signal to foreign investors that their investment shall be protected when 
the host state goes back on the assurances that induced the investor to 
invest.175 By not including legitimate expectations even in the narrower 
form, the Indian Model BIT tilts the scale in favour of host state’s 
regulatory power. 
Another key omission in Article 3.1 of the Indian Model BIT is the 
 
 170The concept of legitimate expectations has become central to the FET standard in most 
BITs. See, Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A v. The United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter, Tecmed]; Occidental, supra 
note 9, at ¶ 183, 190; Enron Award, supra note 8, at ¶ 260; PSEG Global et al. v. Republic of 
Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, ¶¶ 252–253 (Jan. 19, 2007); Duke Energy v. 
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, ¶ 340 (Aug. 18, 2008).  
 171Glamis Gold, supra note 156, at ¶ 621; Thunderbird, supra note 159, at ¶ 147.  
 172For example, in Tecmed, supra note 170, at ¶ 154, the arbitral tribunal gave a very 
expansive and wide meaning to legitimate expectations: “The foreign investor expects the 
host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its 
relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and 
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and 
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such 
regulations. Any and all State actions conforming to such criteria should relate not only to 
the guidelines, directives or requirements issued, or the resolutions approved thereunder, but 
also to the goals underlying such regulations.” See also CMS Award, supra note 8, at ¶ 277; 
National Grid v. Argentina, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 176–79 (Nov. 3, 2008).  
 173See also Canada-EU CETA art 8.10 (4); Michele Potesta, Legitimate Expectations in 
Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept, 
28 ICSID REVIEW 88, 105–10 (2013).   
 174Henckels, supra note 30, at 38.  
 175Henckels, in context of Canada-EU CETA, where such a meaning of legitimate 
expectations is given, writes that the text should also clarify the circumstances in which it 
would be permissible for the host State to deviate “from legitimate expectations once 
established.” See Henckels, supra note 30, at 38.   
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ground of arbitrariness to challenge host state’s regulatory measure. Many 
ISDS tribunals,176 including NAFTA tribunals, have held that if a state acts 
in a manifestly arbitrary manner, it breaches the IMS.177  The ICJ, in the 
ELSI case,178 gave some guidance regarding the meaning of arbitrary action. 
The court said arbitrariness “is not so much something opposed to a rule of 
law, as something opposed to the rule of law . . . [i]t is a willful disregard of 
due process of law, an act which shocks, at least surprises, a sense of 
juridical propriety.”179 Non-inclusion of something like “manifest 
arbitrariness” in the Indian Model BIT as one of the grounds to challenge 
the host state’s regulatory conduct leaves a gap in the protection of foreign 
investment. The inclusion of “manifest arbitrariness” would have meant 
that while the host state’s regulatory conduct would be judged using a high 
standard and thus provide enough regulatory latitude, it would also ensure 
that foreign investors have a recourse when host states acts in bad faith or in 
an irrational or manifestly unreasonable manner.  
Notwithstanding the absence of “manifest arbitrariness,” a critical 
question is whether a foreign investor could make use of “customary 
international law” in Article 3.1 to invoke “manifest arbitrariness” as a 
ground to challenge host state’s regulatory conduct. The answer to this 
question would depend on the ISDS tribunal. Also, the reference to 
“fundamental breach of due process” in Article 3.1 means that a host state 
can be held liable only if a violation of due process reaches a particular 
threshold of severity and not otherwise. However, in the absence of any 
guidance in the text about the meaning of “fundamental,” it is again left to 
the discretion of ISDS tribunals to determine the threshold of severity.180 
Therefore, while Article 3.1 of the Indian Model BIT imposes some 
limitations on the interpretative authority of ISDS tribunals by specifically 
trying to define the content of IMS, it is still open to question whether the 
reference to “customary international law” could be used to bring in other 
elements into the equation. Also, by not specifically mentioning FET in the 
Model BIT, India has been able to get rid of the problems pertaining to 
determining the content of the standard and also its expansive definition. 
 
 176Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 284 
(Mar. 17, 2006); Metaplar v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5, Award, 
¶187 (January 6, 2008); AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The 
Republic of Hungary, Award, ¶ 9.3.40. (Sept. 23, 2010).  
 177Thunderbird, supra note 159, at ¶ 197; See also Glamis Gold, supra note 156, at ¶ 625; 
Cargill v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, ¶ 298 (Sept. 18, 2009).  
 178ELSI supra note 155, at ¶ 128 
 179Id.  
 180Henckels makes the same point for ‘fundamental breach of due process’ given in the 
FET provision of the Canada-EU CETA, see Article 8.10(2)(b). See, e.g., Henckels, supra 
note 30; see also Ursula Kriebaum, FET and Expropriation in the (Invisible) EU Model BIT 
15 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 454, 474 (2014). 
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However, the absence of grounds like manifest arbitrariness or narrowed 
formulation of legitimate expectations against which host state’s regulatory 
conduct could be judged tilts the scale towards host state’s right to regulate.    
VI. EXPROPRIATION 
A very important substantive provision in most BITs is the rule against 
expropriation whereby a state is prohibited from “taking” privately-owned 
property, directly or indirectly, except for public purposes, in accordance 
with due process and with compensation.181 Where expropriation takes 
place fulfilling all the conditions as aforementioned, it is lawful; non-
fulfillment of any of these conditions renders it unlawful.182 Direct 
expropriations—“taking” coming through the state’s actions thereby 
depriving investors of legal title183—have become rare.184 As modern states 
adopt a number of regulations to regulate various spheres of life, instances 
of indirect interference with investor’s property rights have become more 
prominent. However, the difficulty is in determining when such indirect 
interference constitutes expropriation.185 Indirect expropriation refers to the 
deprivation of the substantial benefits flowing from the investment without 
any formal “taking” of the property.186 Whether host country’s regulatory 
measures result in indirect expropriation is a question that has acquired 
prominence due to a range of sovereign regulatory functions being 
challenged as acts of expropriation by different foreign investors under 
BITs in the last decade or so. This includes expropriation cases against 
Argentina for adopting regulatory measures to save itself from an extremely 
severe economic and financial crisis;187 claims of expropriation for 
 
 181See generally SALACUSE, supra note 1, at 313-357; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, 
at 98-129; NEWCOMBE AND PARADELL, supra note 1, at 341–69.  
 182PRABHASH RANJAN & PUSHKAR ANAND, Determination of Indirect Expropriation and 
Doctrine of Police Power in International Investment Law, in JUDGING THE STATE IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW 127-151 (Leila Choukroune ed., 2016). 
 183SALACUSE, supra note 1, at 322 
 184DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 101.  
 185See generally Feldman, supra note 9, at ¶ 100 (The Feldman tribunal recognised the 
difficulty by saying that direct expropriation was relatively easy whereas ‘it is much less 
clear when the governmental action that interferes with broadly-defined property rights . . . 
crosses the line from valid regulation to compensable taking’); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., Principles of Corporate Governance (2004); Spears, supra note 15, at 
1049-105; Ursula Kriebaum, Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and 
the State 8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 717 (2007). 
 186DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 92; SALACUSE, supra note 1, at 297; Starrett 
Housing Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-US CTR 122, 154 (1983). See also 
Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton, and TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 Iran-US CTR 219, 225 (1984).  
 187See generally supra note 8. 
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environment-related regulatory measure,188 regulatory measures aimed at 
addressing the supply of drinking water,189 and regulatory measures 
involving sovereign functions like taxation.190  
However, most BITs do not provide much guidance on how to 
determine whether a host state’s regulatory measure amounts to indirect 
expropriation or not. Over a period, ISDS tribunals have developed 
different tests for ascertaining whether indirect expropriation has taken 
place or not. First among these tests is the sole effects test, where the focus 
is only on the severity of the effect of the regulatory measure on foreign 
investment.191 According to this test, measures that do not constitute direct 
expropriation may nevertheless constitute indirect expropriation if the effect 
of the regulatory measure causes a substantial deprivation of foreign 
investment.192 Second, is the police power doctrine according to which state 
measures that are prima facie a lawful exercise of powers of the government 
(such as adopting a measure pursuing legitimate public welfare objective), 
may affect foreign interests considerably without amounting to 
expropriation.193 Apart from these two tests, there is a third approach for 
determining indirect expropriation, proportionality analysis, which requires 
balancing the public purpose behind the regulatory measure with the effect 
that measure has on foreign investment.194  
 
 188See supra note 6. 
 189See Biwater Gauff Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 
Award, (Jul. 24, 2008). 
 190See Occidental supra note 9; EnCana supra note 9. 
 191See Ben Mostafa, The Sole Effects Doctrine, Police Powers and Indirect Expropriation 
under International Law, 15 AUSTRALIAN J. INT’L. L 267, 267-296 (2008). 
 192See Pope and Talbot v. Canada, Ad hoc Tribunal (UNCITRAL), Interim Award, ¶ 96 
(June 26, 2000); PSEG, supra note 170, at ¶¶ 278-80; CMS Award, supra note 8, at ¶ 262. 
 193See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 532 (2008); G.C. 
Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law? 38 BRIT. Y.B 
INT’L. L. 307, 335-338 (1962); J. Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and 
Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 517-519 (1999); George H. 
Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran 
United States Claims Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INT’L. L. 585, 609 (1994); ALAIN PELLET, Police 
Powers or the State’s Right to Regulate, in BUILDING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW - 
THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF ICSID  447-462 (M. Kinnear ed., 2015); Methanex supra note 6, at p 
4, ¶ 7; Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 284 
(Mar. 17, 2006); El Paso v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award (Oct. 31, 2011). 
 194See ALEC STONE SWEET, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, in 
LAW & ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (forthcoming 2010); Caroline Henckels, Indirect 
Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the 
Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration, 15:1 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 223-255 (2012); 
Prabhash Ranjan, Using Public Law Concept of Proportionality to Balance Investment 
Protection with Regulation in International Investment Law: A Critical Appraisal, 3 
CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 853, 883 (2014); Tecmed supra note 170; LG&E supra note 
8 at, ¶ 195; Azurix Corp. v. Argentina., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 312 (July 14, 
2006); El Paso, ¶ 241; Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on 
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The problem is that which approach to apply in any given case 
depends primarily on the discretion of the ISDS tribunal because most BITs 
are silent on how to determine indirect expropriation. In view of this, if the 
objective is to constrain unfettered regulatory discretion, then a BIT should 
clearly specify a particular approach. Article 5.1 of the Model BIT prohibits 
nationalization or expropriation either directly or through measures having 
an effect equivalent to expropriation, except for public purpose, in 
accordance with due process and on payment of adequate compensation.195 
The Model BIT explains that direct expropriation occurs either through 
nationalization or through a formal transfer of title or outright seizure.196 
Article 5.3 (a)(ii) of the Model BIT provides that indirect expropriation 
occurs if a country’s measure or a series of measures has an effect 
“equivalent to direct expropriation,” i.e. the effect should result in 
substantial or permanent deprivation of investor’s fundamental attributes of 
property—rights of use, enjoyment, and disposal—of the investment, 
although without formal transfer of title.197 This is a clear reference to the 
sole effects doctrine to determine indirect expropriation.  
However, to muddy the water, Article 5.3 (b) of the Model BIT 
provides: that the determination of whether a measure or a series of 
measures have an effect equivalent to expropriation requires a case-by-case, 
fact-based inquiry, which takes into consideration the following: 
(i) the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, 
although the sole fact that a measure or series of measures of a Party 
has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment does 
not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; 
(ii) the duration of the measure or series of measures of a Party; 
(iii) the character of the measure or series of measures, notably their 
object, context and intent; and 
(iv) whether a measure by a Party breaches the Party’s prior binding 
written commitment to the investor whether by contract, licence or 
 
Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 285 (Jan. 14, 2010). 
 1952016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art 5.1. 
 196Id. art. 5.3(a)(i) provides: “The Parties confirm their shared understanding that: a) 
Expropriation may be direct or indirect: (i) direct expropriation occurs when an investment is 
nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright 
seizure.” 
 197Id. art. 5.3(a)(ii) provides: “The Parties confirm their shared understanding that: a) 
Expropriation may be direct or indirect: (ii) indirect expropriation occurs if a measure or 
series of measures of a Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation, in that it 
substantially or permanently deprives the investor of the fundamental attributes of property 
in its investment, including the right to use, enjoy and dispose of its investment, without 
formal transfer of title or outright seizure.” 
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other legal document. 
In order to determine whether there is an effect equivalent to 
expropriation, this part mandates an ISDS tribunal to adopt a case by case, 
fact-based inquiry, taking into account a number of factors, which includes 
the economic impact198 of the measures; duration; character of the measures 
including their object and intent; and whether there has been a breach of 
prior written commitment to the investor.199 So far as duration and 
economic impact are to be taken into consideration as factors to determine 
the effect of alleged measures, one is still in bounds of sole effects doctrine. 
However, the moment, as required by the Model BIT, character, object, and 
intent of the alleged measure are taken into consideration, one steps away 
from sole effect doctrine and treads into proportionality analysis for 
determination of indirect expropriation.200 This kind of treaty language 
raises two difficult questions. First, in determination of indirect 
expropriation, how does one reconcile the substantial deprivation test, 
which focuses only on effect of regulatory measure and not on purpose 
behind the impugned regulatory measure, given in Article 5.3(a)(ii), with 
the proportionality test, given in Article 5.3 (b) (i-iv), where both effect and 
purpose have to be taken into account? Second, assuming that an ISDS 
tribunal decides to use proportionality method, how will this tribunal, in the 
context of Article 5.3(b), decide what weight to be given to each factor? 
Should the economic impact of the measure on foreign investment be given 
more importance than the objective and intent behind the measure or vice-
versa? The text does not answer these questions and thus vests high 
discretion in the hands of ISDS tribunals.201 This significant discretion will 
 
 198Id. art. 5.3 (b)(i) (explaining that the adverse economic impact on the investments does 
not establish the occurrence of indirect expropriation). 
 199Id. art. 5.3(b)(iv). Expropriation provision in some new BITs contain this kind of 
language see, Canada-EU CETA, annex 8-A; US Model BIT 2012, annex B (4)(a); Canadian 
Model BIT 2004, annex B.13(1). This kind of language is largely reflective of the test laid 
down in a leading US Case on regulatory takings – Penn Central Transport v. City of New 
York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-125 (1978). 
 200On use of proportionality in ISDS, See generally BENEDICT KINGSBURY & STEPHAN W. 
SCHILL, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions in 
the Public Interest – The Concept of Proportionality, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 74-104 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010); A. KULICK, GLOBAL 
PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 171-173 (2012); Henckels, supra note 
194.  
 201See Henckels, supra note 30, (who offers similar critique for the Canada-EU CETA 
that contains similarly worded expropriation provision as the Indian Model BIT.) This test 
has also been criticized by others. For similar arguments in case of EU’s proposal on indirect 
expropriation in the Transatlantic Treaty and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, 
See Federico Ortino, Defining Indirect Expropriation: The Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership and the (Elusive) Search for ‘Greater Certainty,’ 43 LEGAL ISSUES 
OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, 351 (2016).  
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allow ISDS tribunals to second-guess the regulatory measures adopted by 
host states by weighing and balancing the benefit of these measures with 
the effect on foreign investment.202 Such a determination would either result 
in foreign investment protection trumping over the host state’s regulatory 
power or vice versa based on the subjective determination of the tribunal.203 
The complications do not end here. In addition to the sole effect test 
and the proportionality test, Article 5 also includes the police power 
doctrine: “non-discriminatory regulatory measures or the awards of the 
judicial bodies of a host state that are designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public interest or public purpose objectives such as health, safety 
and environment shall not constitute expropriation under this article.”204 
The formulation of the aforesaid exception is quite close to the language 
used by the Methanex tribunal in its pronouncement of the doctrine of 
police powers where it held that “[A] non-discriminatory regulation for a 
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which 
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed 
expropriatory. . . .”205 Similarly worded provisions are also present in other 
treaties such as EU-Canada CETA.206 However, in these treaties, such 
provisions are qualified by the following words: “except in rare 
circumstances.”207 For example, Annex 8-A (3) of the EU-Canada CETA 
provides: “for greater certainty, except in the rare circumstance when the 
impact of a measure or series of measures is so severe in light of its purpose 
 
 202See Han Xiuli, The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in Tecmed v. 
Mexico, 6 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 635, 636-37 (2007) (explaining that a proportionality analysis 
will contain three steps that must be assessed cumulatively. First, whether the measure is 
suitable for the legitimate public purpose—this will require a causal link between the 
measure and its object. If the measure satisfies, the first step, then, second step will be to find 
out whether the measure is necessary i.e. whether there is a less restrictive alternative 
measure that will achieve the same objective. If indeed the measure is ‘necessary’, then the 
third step (also known as proportionality stricto sensu) will involve balancing the effects of 
the measure on the right that has been affected with the public benefit sought to be achieved 
by the measure); KINGSBURY & SCHILL, supra note 200, at 85-88; KULICK, supra note 200, at 
186-189; Erlend M. Leonhardsen, Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality 
Analysis in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 3 J. INT. DISP. SETTLEMENT 95 (2012); Jan H. 
Jans, Proportionality Revisited, 27 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 239, 240-241 
(2000). 
 203See Ranjan, supra note 194; See also BENEDIKT PIRKER, Seeing the Forest Without the 
Trees – The Doubtful Case for Proportionality Analysis in International Investment 
Arbitration, in PROPORTIONALITY AND POST-NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (Alexia Herwig 
et al. eds., 2011). 
 2042016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art. 5.5. 
 205Methanex supra note 6. 
 206See Canada-EU CETA, supra note 31, annex 8-A(3); Trans-Pacific Partnership, Annex 
9-B(3)(b), Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-
pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text. 
 207See Canada-EU CETA, supra note 31, annex 8-A(3). 
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that it appears manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory measures of a Party 
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, 
such as health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations.”208 This provision, unlike Article 5.5 of the Indian Model 
BIT, recognises that there may be situations where a host state’s non-
discriminatory measures designed and applied for public welfare purposes 
may amount to expropriation when the impact of a measure is manifestly 
excessive on foreign investment in light of its object and purpose.209 
Although it may be difficult to determine when measures are excessive in 
light of the regulatory purpose they seek to achieve,210 language such as this 
at least provides an opportunity to balance investment protection with a host 
state’s regulatory power. In the case of the Indian Model BIT, Article 5.5 
does not recognise any such opportunity. Thus, even if the impact of the 
regulatory measures is manifestly excessive or disproportionate, the 
regulatory measure will not amount to expropriation as long as the measure 
satisfies the bare minimum threshold of being non-discriminatory and 
aiming to fulfil some public welfare measure. Even the usual benchmarks to 
check regulatory overreach such as ensuring that a measure is adopted in 
“good faith” or following “due process” do not find any mention in Article 
5.5. This leaves a major gap in protection of foreign investment because it 
allows the host state to completely shift the cost of a regulatory measure on 
foreign investors, which clearly tilts the balance in favour of the host state. 
Also, a broad provision such as this, with limited checks, could be abused 
by host states by adopting sweeping regulatory measures to further the 
claim for a large public benefit, which again would compromise protection 
of foreign investment.211 
In sum, the expropriation provision does not reduce the arbitral 
discretion. Whether the state’s right to regulate will be balanced with 
investment protection, to a great extent, will depend on the ISDS tribunal 
interpreting the provision. With reference to the inclusion of the police 
power doctrine, the scale tilts in favour of the host state. 
    
VII.  FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY 
Another major treaty provision found in most BITs is “full protection 
and security” (FPS). As part of this provision, host states undertake an 
obligation to provide FPS to foreign investment. However, BITs, like the 
FET provision, do not usually define FPS. This has given rise to the debate 
of whether FPS is confined to the physical safety and protection of 
 
 208Id.  
 209Id. 
 210See Henckels, supra note 30 at 42-43.  
 211KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, US INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 296 (2009). 
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investments or if it also includes other kinds of protection.212 Many 
tribunals have interpreted FPS to mean that it puts the host state under an 
obligation to ensure physical safety and protection of foreign investment.213 
Some arbitral tribunals have expanded the meaning of FPS from physical 
protection to also include regulatory and legal security.214 For example, in 
CME v. Czech Republic, the tribunal, while analyzing the obligation of FPS 
held that “the host State is obligated to ensure that neither by amendment of 
its laws nor by actions of its administrative bodies is the agreed and 
approved security and protection of the foreign investor’s investment 
withdrawn or devalued.”215 We still have some tribunals that have held that 
FPS only provides protection to foreign investment from physical injury 
and does not encompass other kinds of regulatory protection such as 
maintenance of a stable and legal commercial or business environment.216 
The 2016 Model BIT provides that foreign investment and investors 
shall be accorded full protection and security.217 Further, the 2016 Model 
provides that FPS is restricted to physical security for foreign investment 
and investors and does not extend to “any other obligation whatsoever.”218 
Given the arbitral maze on the actual scope of the FPS provision, this 
clarity in the Indian Model BIT will help curb arbitral discretion. It also 
reconciles investment protection with the host state’s regulatory power. On 
the one hand, it puts the host state under an obligation to provide physical 
security to foreign investments, and at the same time, ensures that the host 
state’s adoption of regulatory measures that might impact the business or 
legal environment cannot be challenged as a violation of FPS, though such 
regulatory measures may be susceptible to challenge under other BIT 
provisions. 
 
 212DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 160-61.  
 213See AAPL supra note 130; American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of 
Zaire, ICSID Case No ARB/93/1, Award (Feb. 21, 1997).  
 214NEWCOMBE AND PARADELL, supra note 1, at 310. 
 215CME Czech Republic v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 613 (Sept. 
13, 2001); See also Azurix, supra note 194, at ¶¶ 406-408; Siemens v. Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 303 (Feb. 6, 2007); National Grid, supra note 172, at ¶ 187-90; 
Total S.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 343, 
(Dec. 27, 2010).  
 216AWG Group v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on 
Liability, ¶179 (Jul. 30, 2010); See also Saluka, supra note 176, at ¶ 484; BG Group Plc. v. 
The Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶323-326 (Dec. 24, 2007); Crystallex 
International Corporation v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶ 632, (Apr. 4, 2016).  
 217See 2016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art 3.2. 
 218Id. art. 3.2 provides: “For greater certainty, ‘full protection and security’ only refers to 
a Party’s obligations relating to physical security of investors and to investments made by 
the investors of the other Party and not to any other obligation whatsoever.” Emphasis 
added. 
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VIII. MONETARY TRANSFER PROVISIONS 
Monetary Transfer Provisions (MTPs) in BITs regulate the transfer of 
funds related to investment in and out of the country. MTPs in BITs should 
not be confused with admission requirement clauses under which a host 
state is obligated to admit new investments.219 MTPs in BITs cover 
transfers related to investments that have been made such as allowing entry 
of new capital to augment existing investment or to allow outflow of 
incomes derived from the investment made. A typical MTP in a BIT 
identifies the “transfer” or “payment” to which the provision applies and 
also provides the conditions governing such transfers, such as whether the 
transfer is to be made in foreign currency and whether the transfer can be 
made promptly.220 In most BITs, MTPs cover all “transfers” or “payments” 
related to investment.221 Further, depending on the treaty language, MTPs 
cover both inflows and outflows of funds.222 These “transfers” include both 
current transfers223 and capital transfers.224  
MTPs are an integral part of the protection offered to foreign 
investment by host States in BITs. MTPs are important for foreign investors 
because they provide the freedom to transfer all funds related to investment 
for a number of business-related needs.225 For example, a foreign investor 
may need to bring in additional capital to support the existing investment or 
might need to repatriate capital back to the home country in order to service 
debts or to pay dividends or to repatriate proceeds of the sale of investment, 
etc.226 Restrictions on the transfer of funds related to an investment may 
result in investment not being made in the first place, because foreign 
investors will be deprived of the benefits accruing from the investment 
(such as repatriating profits) and will also not have the freedom to develop 
their investment (for example, bringing in additional capital to support the 
existing investment).227 Thus, as a general matter, foreign investors tend to 
 
 219UNCTAD, TRANSFER OF FUNDS 32 (2000), http://unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd20.en.pdf.  
 220VANDEVELDE, supra note 16, at 317. 
 221Id. 
 222Id., at 319.  
 223For example, the obligation on States to allow free outward transfer of income derived 
from investments is an example of current transfers–the 2003 Indian Model BIT provides 
transfers of “Net operating profits including dividends and interest in proportion to their 
share-holdings,” which is an example of current transaction. 2003 Indian Model BIT, supra 
note 37, art. 7(1)(b). 
 224For example, the 2003 Indian Model BIT, art. 7(1)(f) provides an example of capital 
transaction–“Proceeds received by investors in case of sale or partial sale or liquidation.” 
2003 Indian Model BIT, supra note 37, art. 7(1)(f). 
 225DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 212.  
 226SALACUSE, supra note 1, at 150. 
 227Thomas Wälde & Abba Kolo, Investor-State Disputes: The Interface between Treaty-
Based International Investment Protection and Fiscal Sovereignty. 35 INTERTAX (2007) 424-
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be free, at all times, to transfer funds in and out of the host country.  
For the foreign investor to freely transfer funds out of the country, it is 
necessary to draw from the host country’s foreign exchange reserve (for 
example, by converting earnings in the local currency into an international 
currency by drawing from the foreign exchange reserve).228 However, the 
host country’s foreign exchange reserve is finite and also serves other 
significant purposes, like paying for imports and maintaining the value of 
the domestic currency.229 Thus, if the freedom to transfer funds out of the 
country severely impacts the finite foreign exchange reserve of the host 
country, the country could impose restrictions on the conversion of local 
currency into foreign currency,230 which, in turn, will impact the right of the 
foreign investor to transfer funds out of the country. Similarly, large 
infusions of capital by the foreign investor can have adverse 
macroeconomic consequences, such as the appreciation of the country’s 
currency, the consequent reduction of export competitiveness, and the 
widening of the current account deficit; it can also result in inflation by 
increasing the monetary supply, which can have other adverse 
macroeconomic consequences.231 These might also compel the host state to 
impose restrictions on inflows, which could impact the rights of foreign 
investors. This brings the imposition of certain regulatory measures such as 
capital controls in a direct potential confrontation with the MTPs in BITs.   
The 2016 Model BIT recognises the investor’s right to transfer all 
funds related to investment such as contributions to capital, profits, 
dividends, interest payments, etc.232 However, the investor’s right to 
transfer funds is subject to three restrictions. First, Article 6.1 subjects the 
investor’s right to transfer funds to the domestic laws of the host State. In 
1999 India enacted the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA).233 
Although Section 6(1) of the Act allows for capital account transactions, 
this allowance subject to section 6(2), which gives the power to the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI) to specify, in consultation with the central government, 
any class or classes of capital account transactions which are permissible 
and the limit up to which foreign exchange shall be admissible for such 
transactions.234 Also, Section 6(3) gives power to the RBI to prohibit, 
restrict, or regulate a number of capital account transactions.235  
 
449, 434.   
 228VANDEVELDE, supra note 16, at 316.  
 229Id.  
 230Id.   
 231SALACUSE, supra note 1, at 256.   
 2322016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art. 6.1. 
 233The Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999, § 6(1), No. 42, Acts of Parliament, 
(1999) http://indiacode.nic.in. 
 234Id. § 6(2)(b). 
 235Id. §§ 6(3), (a) - (j). 
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Second, Article 6.3 of the 2016 Model BIT provides that “nothing in 
this treaty shall prevent” the host state the good faith application of its laws, 
including actions relating to bankruptcy, insolvency, compliance with 
judicial decisions, labor obligations and laws on taxation, etc.236 Third, 
Article 6.4 of the 2016 Model BIT provides that the host state may 
temporarily restrict the investor’s right to transfer funds in the event of 
serious BoP difficulties or in situations where movement of capital could 
cause or threaten to cause “serious difficulties for macroeconomic 
management.” While this formulation provides a textual basis to balance 
the investor’s right to transfer funds and the host State’s regulatory power, 
it is still not clear which situations would qualify as a serious balance of 
payment difficulty.   
The same exception for serious BoP difficulties and external financial 
difficulties is also found in the general exceptions, Article 32.2 of the 2016 
Model BIT (discussed in the following section). This will allow India to 
deviate from all substantive obligations, including MTPs, in order to 
remedy serious BoP problems, exchange-rate difficulties, and external 
financial difficulties.237 Since these exceptions are already given as part of 
MTPs in Article 6, one does not understand the need of having them again 
in the general exception clause. Alternatively, if these exceptions are given 
in the general exception clause, then there is no need to have them as part of 
the MTP provision. Overall, the MTPs in the 2016 Model BIT protects the 
interest of foreign investors by allowing free transfer of funds. At the same 
time, by subjecting these transfers to certain conditions it allows the host 
state to exercise its right to regulate.  
IX. NON-PRECLUDED-MEASURES (NPM) CLAUSES OR GENERAL 
EXCEPTIONS 
Non-Precluded Measures (NPM) provisions in a BIT, also known as 
General Exceptions clauses, starting with words such as “nothing in this 
agreement precludes. . .,” provide the regulatory latitude to host countries to 
deal with threats to important national interests.238 NPM provisions provide 
flexibility to countries to deviate from the substantive obligations in certain 
circumstances that warrant giving preference to non-investment policy 
goals over investment protection. Given the debate on the conflict between 
investment protection and host countries’ regulatory power, NPM 
provisions in BITs are useful tools that allow a host country to adopt 
measures for the pursuit of non-investment objectives without incurring any 
 
 2362015 Draft Indian Model BIT, supra note 102, art. 6.3, sub-items (i) to (xi). 
 237Id. art. 16.1 (iii). 
 238SALACUSE, supra note 1, 343; ANDREW NEWCOMBE, General Exceptions in 
International Investment Agreements, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT 
LAW 356–357 (Marie-Claire C. Segger et. al. eds. 2011). 
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liability under international law. 
NPM provisions in BITs were put to a test when a spate of arbitration 
cases was brought against Argentina for adopting measures aimed at 
addressing an economic crisis in early 2000.239 For example, U.S. investors 
claimed that the regulatory measures adopted by Argentina violated many 
provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, whereas Argentina relied on the 
NPM provision given in Article XI of the BIT240 as a defence for these 
claims.241 These cases, despite similar facts and law, have resulted in 
conflicting decisions with some ISDS tribunals concluding that Argentina’s 
action cannot be condoned under Article XI242 whereas some have held 
otherwise.243 
An NPM provision has two main elements: first, the permissible 
objectives, and second, the nexus requirement. Permissible objectives 
means those objectives mentioned in the NPM provision for which the host 
state can deviate from its treaty obligations. It is important to note that a 
host state will be able to deviate from its BIT obligations, relying on the 
NPM provision, only for those objectives that are contained in the NPM 
provision and not for other objectives.244 A nexus requirement in an NPM 
provision is the link between adopted measures and the permissible 
objective to be achieved through that measure. Words such as “necessary” 
require a stronger connection between the regulatory measure and 
permissible objective compared to words such as “related to.” 
The 2016 Model BIT contains a separate chapter on exceptions 
covering both general and security exceptions. Article 32 contains general 
 
 239For more on the Argentine economic crisis and subsequent IIA disputes see ALVAREZ 
& KHAMSI, supra note 15; For Argentine case, see supra note 8. 
 240US-Argentina BIT provides “[t]his treaty shall not preclude the application by either 
party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, 
or the protection of its own essential security interests.” US-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, 
art. XI. 
 241See supra note 8, for a list of cases where Argentina invoked NPM provision. 
 242CMS Award, supra note 8; Enron Award, supra note 8; Sempra Award, supra note 8.   
 243LG&E, supra note 8; Continental Casualty Award, supra note 8.  
 244For more discussion on this see William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, 
Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-
Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 314 
(2008). For a discussion on NPM provision in Indian BITs see Prabhash Ranjan, Non-
Precluded Measures in Indian International Investment Agreements and India’s Regulatory 
Power as a Host Nation 2 ASIAN J. INT. L. 29 (2012); Amit Kumar Sinha, Non-Precluded 
Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties of South Asian Countries, ASIAN J. INT. 
L. (2016), doi:10.1017/ S2044251316000023. For a different view point on the inclusion of 
General Exception clauses in BITs, see ANDREW NEWCOMBE, The Use of General 
Exceptions in IIAs: Increasing Legitimacy or Uncertainty? in IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 267 (Armand de Mestral & Celine Lévesque eds. 2013).   
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exceptions with a long list of permissible objectives, which includes 
protection of public morals;245 maintenance of public order;246 protection of 
human, animal, or plant life or health;247 protection and conservation of the 
environment;248 to ensure compliance with domestic laws that are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of the treaty.249 The inclusion of these 
permissible objectives will provide opportunities to reconcile investment 
protection with the host state’s right to regulate. 
Another interesting aspect of the NPM provision is that it contains 
“necessary” as the only nexus requirement for all the above-mentioned 
permissible objectives. Furthermore, the 2016 Model BIT, in footnote 6, 
provides guidance to the arbitral tribunal in how to determine whether a 
measure is “necessary.”250 Footnote 6 provides that in considering whether 
a measure is necessary, the tribunal shall take into account whether there 
was no less restrictive alternative measure reasonably available to the 
country or not. The first author of this article has already argued for this 
interpretation of necessary to be put in the text.251   
This meaning of necessary is partly inspired from the WTO 
jurisprudence, which has developed a two-tier test to determine the meaning 
of necessary in Article XX of GATT.252 The test involves, first, the 
proportionality, or the weighing and balancing, test, which will weigh and 
balance different factors like the importance of the regulatory value 
pursued, the contribution made by the challenged measure to the regulatory 
value, and the restrictive effect of the measure on international trade. 
Second, if the first step yields a preliminary conclusion of the measure 
being necessary, then the second step should compare this measure with 
other least trade restrictive measures, which are reasonably available to the 
importing country.253 If such measures are available then the impugned 
 
 2452016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art 32.1 (i). 
 246Id. 
 247Id. art. 32.1 (ii). 
 248Id. art. 32.1 (iv). 
 249Id. art. 32.1 (iii).  
 250Id. art. 32.1 n. 6. 
 251Ranjan, supra note 244, at 33–34; Ranjan, Ph.D. Thesis, supra note 57. For a different 
view on this see Raju, supra note 79. 
 252See Chad P. Brown & Joel P. Trachtman, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreaded Tyres: A Balancing Act, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 85, 87 (2009). For WTO 
jurisprudence on ‘necessary’ in Article XX of GATT see Appellate Body Report, Korea—
Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WTO Doc. WT/DS 161 and 
169/AB/R (adopted Dec. 11, 2000); Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic—
Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS302/AB/R (adopted Apr. 25, 2005); Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures 
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007). 
 253Andrew D. Mitchell & Caroline Henckels, Variations on a Theme: Comparing the 
Concept of “Necessity” in International Investment Law and WTO Law, 14 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 
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measure is not necessary. The Indian Model BIT has adopted the second 
part of the two-tier test. Consequently, this will not allow for any weighing 
and balancing review, or, in other words, for subjective assessment to be 
made by an ISDS tribunal regarding whether a regulatory measure is 
significant vis-à-vis the cost imposed on foreign investment. By specifying 
the meaning of necessary, the Indian Model BIT has curtailed arbitral 
discretion, and at the same time, it ensures that foreign investment will get 
adequate protection by requiring that only least investment restrictive 
measures which are reasonably available to the host country be adopted.  
The specification of the meaning of necessary also ensures that an 
ISDS tribunal should not conflate treaty based defence of necessity with the 
necessity defence under customary international law.254 This is specifically 
important as many ISDS tribunals interpreted necessary in the treaty by 
taking recourse to necessary in customary international law255 like the 
necessary interpretation in Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT.256  
However, a major textual flaw in Article 32 is the absence of a 
chapeau, which would have ensured that host states’ measures are applied 
in a manner that does not constitute a misuse or abuse of the NPM 
provisions. The only requirement is that measures should be applied on a 
‘non-discriminatory’ basis.257 To make sure that host states don’t abuse 
their regulatory power, the NPM provisions should contain a chapeau 
specifying that there shall be no unjustifiable discrimination or that there 
shall be no disguised restriction, as is the case with Article XX of GATT.258  
 
93, 98 (2013).  
 254G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, at 
art. 25 (Dec. 12, 2001) provides: “(1) Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground 
for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation 
of that State unless the act: (a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of 
the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as 
a whole. (2) In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
wrongfulness if: (a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of 
invoking necessity; or (b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.” 
 255See CMS Award, supra note 8; Enron Award, supra note 8. Some tribunals didn’t 
follow this approach–Continental Casualty Award, supra note 8; See also Jürgen Kurtz, 
Adjudging the exceptional at International Investment law: Security, Public Order and 
Financial Crisis, 59:2 INT’L. & COMP. L. QTRLY. 325-371 (2010)  
 256US-Argentina BIT, supra note 14, at art. 11: “This Treaty shall not preclude the 
application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the 
fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests.” 
 257See 2016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art. 32.1. 
 258The significance of the chapeau in context of Article XX of GATT has been repeatedly 
asserted by the WTO Appellate Body. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted Apr. 29, 
1996); Appellate Body Report, United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
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In sum, the general exception clause is precisely drafted and does 
impose constraints on the exercise of arbitral discretion. However, the 
absence of a full-fledged chapeau of the kind found in Article XX of GATT 
opens the possibility of a regulatory abuse by host states. 
X. OTHER EXCEPTIONS 
Apart from the NPM provisions or the general exception clauses, 
Article 2 of the 2016 Model BIT, while describing the scope and coverage 
of the treaty, specifically excludes certain regulatory measures from the 
purview of the treaty. We discuss two important regulatory measures here.  
Taxation  
Article 2.4 (ii) states that the treaty shall not apply to “any law or 
measure regarding taxation, including measures taken to enforce taxation 
obligations.”259 This article further provides that a host state’s decision that 
a particular regulatory measure is related to taxation, whether made before 
or after the commencement of arbitral proceedings, shall be non-
justiciable.260 No arbitral tribunal shall be able to review such decision.261  
As previously discussed, in response to Vodafone and Cairn 
challenging India’s retrospective application of taxation law under different 
BITs, it is quite evident that India has decided to keep taxation measures 
outside the purview of the BIT. Excluding taxation measures completely 
means that foreign investors shall not be able to challenge such measures 
under BITs under any circumstance. Moreover, allowing host states to have 
the last word on whether a regulatory matter pertains to taxation or not 
might lead to regulatory abuse. In any case, excluding taxation measures 
altogether from the purview of the BIT is a disproportionate reaction 
especially when it has been argued that taxation is part of a state’s police 
power and thus it justifies non-compensation even in cases of deprivation of 
foreign investment.262 Though one concedes that the actual scope of 
claiming that taxation is part of a state’s police powers and is thus non-
compensable is far from settled,263 it is also true that arbitral tribunals 
should give due deference to host states while adjudicating on host state’s 
taxation-related regulatory measures. For example, the tribunal in EnCana 
 
Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998); See also Canada-EU 
CETA supra note 31, art. 28.3. 
 2592016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art 2.4(ii) (emphasis added). 
 260Id.  
 261Id. 
 262NEWCOMBE AND PARADELL, supra note 1, at 358. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 193; 
Louis B. Sohn & R. R. Baxter, International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens 55 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 545 (1961).  
 263RANJAN & ANAND, supra note 182. 
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v. Ecuador recognized that if a tax law “is extraordinary,” or “punitive in 
amount,” a claim of indirect expropriation can be made.264 On the same 
line, the tribunal in Burlington v. Ecuador observed that “confiscatory 
taxation constitutes an expropriation without compensation and is 
unlawful.”265   
Compulsory License  
The Model BIT also excludes the issuance of compulsory licenses 
(“CLs”) from the purview of the BIT provided that such issuance is 
consistent with the WTO treaty.266 In other words, notwithstanding the 
specific exemption of CL from the scope of the BIT, foreign investors can 
still challenge the issuance of CLs as a violation of some BIT provision 
arguing that CLs have not been issued in accordance with the TRIPS 
Agreement.267 In other words, an ISDS tribunal, which may not have 
expertise in WTO law,268 would then have to make a substantive 
determination as to whether the issuance of CL is consistent with TRIPS, if 
not, then the BIT would continue to apply.269 Thus, this provision too, like 
many other provisions previously discussed, does not reduce arbitral 
discretion, which India claimed to be one of the key objectives behind the 
Model BIT.  
XI. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provision in BITs270 acts 
 
 264EnCana, supra note 9, at ¶ 177. 
 265Burlington, supra note 9, at ¶ 395; see also Occidental, supra note 9, at ¶ 85, (“Taxes 
can result in expropriation as can other types of regulatory measures.”); Link-Trading Joint 
Stock Co. v. Dep’t for Customs Control of the Republic of Moldova, Ad Hoc/UNCITRAL, 
Final Award, ¶ 64 (April 18, 2002) (“As a general matter, fiscal measures only become 
expropriatory when they are found to be an abusive taking. Abuse arises where it is 
demonstrated that the State has acted unfairly or inequitably towards the investment, where it 
has adopted measures that are arbitrary or discriminatory in character or in their manner of 
implementation, or where the measures taken violate an obligation undertaken by the State in 
regard to the investment.”) 
 2662016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, at art. 2.4(iii) (providing that the treaty shall 
not apply to “the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property 
rights, or to the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent 
that such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with the international 
obligations of Parties under the WTO Agreement.”)   
 267See Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment Arbitration: 
The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25:3 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 357, 421 (2010); Bryan 
Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights in International 
Investment Agreements, 15:3 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 871, 905–906 (2012).  
 268Mercurio, supra note 267, at 905. 
 269Id. 
 270For a general discussion on ISDS see SALACUSE, supra note 1, at 369–392; see also 
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as a standing offer on part of the host state to submit the dispute to 
arbitration if any foreign investor alleges breach of the substantive 
obligations under that BIT.271 The Indian Model BIT provides for ISDS; 
however, foreign investors recourse to international arbitration is heavily 
qualified in three ways272 discussed below. 
Jurisdictional Qualification  
The Indian Model BIT limits the scope of ISDS to disputes that arise 
out of an alleged breach of an obligation of the host state under Chapter II 
of the BIT and not under any other chapter.273 However, any dispute arising 
from the breach of the obligations contained in Articles 9 (Entry and 
Sojourn of Personnel) and 10 (Transparency) of this Treaty is excluded 
from the scope of ISDS.274 In other words, a foreign investor can bring a 
claim against a host State only for alleged violation of “treatment of 
investments.”275 Treatment of investments includes FPS, national treatment, 
expropriation, MTPs and compensation for losses (a provision that 
obligates a host state to accord national treatment in terms of payment of 
compensation, etc. when foreign investment suffers losses due to war, 
armed conflict, civil strife, etc.).276 The foreign investor cannot bring 
disputes arising out of any other provision of the BIT.  
A very important jurisdictional limit that 2016 Model BIT imposes on 
an ISDS tribunal is to restrict its jurisdiction to disputes arising solely out of 
the breach of the BIT.277 The Model BIT specifically excludes disputes 
arising solely out of the breach of contract between an investor and host 
state from the jurisdiction of an ISDS tribunal, which have to be resolved in 
the domestic courts or in accordance with the dispute resolution process that 
has been provided for specifically in the concerned contract.278 In other 
 
ERIC DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS (2014); CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (2007); VAN HARTEN, 
supra note 12; Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
74:1 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 151 (2003). For detailed discussion of the ISDS provision in the 
2016 Model BIT, see PRABHASH RANJAN & PUSHKAR ANAND, Investor State Dispute 
Settlement in the 2016 Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Does it Go Too Far in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND ARBITRATION ACROSS ASIA (Julien Chaisse & 
Luke Nottage eds., 2018) (forthcoming). 
 271BRABANDERE, supra note 270, at 50–51. 
 272See Hanessian & Duggal, Is this the Change the World Wishes to See (2017), supra 
note 38, at 226. 
 2732016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art. 13.2.  
 274Id. 
 275Id. 
 276Id. art. 7. 
 277Id. art. 13.2; Rajput, supra note 38. 
 278Id. art. 13.2. 
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words, the Indian Model BIT does not contain, what is known as an 
umbrella clause that elevates a contractual breach on the part of the host 
state to the breach of BIT obligations by requiring host states to observe not 
just the treaty, but “any other obligations” it may owe to foreign 
investors.279 “Any other obligations,” arguably, would include contractual 
obligations and therefore an umbrella clause allowing an investor to access 
ISDS even for contractual breaches by the host state, even though the 
purpose of ISDS in BITs is to address treaty breaches.280 Over the years, 
ISDS tribunals have not been consistent in deciding the scope of umbrella 
clauses in BITs.281 Therefore, the specific exclusion of contractual breaches 
from the jurisdiction of ISDS tribunals in the Indian Model BIT is 
significant in both limiting arbitral discretion, and in bringing clarity about 
the rights of foreign investors and host states.282  
In addition to these limits, the Model BIT also imposes two other 
limitations on an ISDS tribunal. First, an ISDS tribunal shall not have the 
jurisdiction to review the merits of a decision made by a domestic judicial 
authority.283 Second, an ISDS tribunal cannot accept jurisdiction over any 
claim that is or has been subject to arbitration under Chapter V of the treaty, 
which provides for interstate dispute settlements.284 
 
 279See, e.g., German Model BIT 2008 art. 7.2, Swiss Model BIT art 10.2; see Christoph 
Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the 
Road, 5:2 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 231 (2004); Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of 
the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment Protection, 20:4 ARBITR. INT’L 
411 (2004); Stephan W. Schill, Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of 
Umbrella Clauses in International Investment Treaties, 18:1 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009); 
Jonathan B. Potts, Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization, 51:4 VA. J. INT’L L. 1005 (2011); BRABANDERE, 
supra note 270, at 38; Thomas W. Walde, The “Umbrella” Clause in Investment 
Arbitration: A Comment on Original Intentions and Recent Cases, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 
& TRADE 183 (2005).  
 280See, e.g., German Model BIT 2008 art. 7.2, Swiss Model BIT art 10.2; see Schreuer, 
supra note 279; Sinclair, supra note 279; Potts, supra note 279; BRABANDERE, supra note 
270, at 38. 
 281See Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2003); Joy Mining supra note 118 
(denying the applicability of umbrella clauses); Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Ad Hoc, 
Partial Award (Aug. 19, 2005) (holding that the umbrella clause automatically transforms a 
contract violation into a treaty violation); Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic 
of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction (Jan. 29, 2004) (holding 
that a contract violation gets transformed into a treaty violation provided that the contract 
does not contain any exclusive dispute settlement clause). 
 282See also Rajput, supra note 38. 
 2832016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art 13.5(i).  
 284Id. art. 13.5(ii).  
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Exhaustion of Local Remedies     
The rule related to “exhaustion of local remedies” is a long-standing 
rule of customary international law,285 even predating the existence of the 
modern international law.286 However, countries in their BITs have 
followed different Models varying from express requirement of exhaustion 
of local remedies,287 to making no reference to exhaustion of local 
remedies,288 to express rejection of the exhaustion principle in certain 
BITs.289  
 
 285Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), Judgement, 1989 
I.C.J. Rep. 1989, ¶ 31 (July 20); Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. U.S.), Judgment, 1959 
I.C.J. Rep. 1959,  ¶ 6 (Mar. 21); See also Theodor Meron, The Incidence of the Rule of 
Exhaustion of Local Remedies, 35 Brit. Y.B. Int’l. L 83 (1959); A.A. Cancado Trindade, 
Origin and Historical Development of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in 
International Law, 12 BELGIAN REV. INT’L L. 499 (1976); CHITTHARANJAN FELIX 
AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2004); JAMES R. 
CRAWFORD & THOMAS D. GRANT, Exhaustion of Local Remedies in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007). 
 286Matthew C. Potterfield, Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come? 41 YALE J. INT’L. L. (2015); see also for the 
doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies in international investment law–Christoph Schreuer, 
Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration, 4 THE L. & 
PRAC. INT’L. CTS. & TRIBUNALS 1 (2005); URSULA KRIEBAUM, Local Remedies and the 
Standards for the Protection of Foreign Investment in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER (2009); Paul Peters, 
Exhaustion of Local Remedies: Ignored in Most Bilateral Investment Treaties 44:2 
NETHERLANDS INT’L. L. REV. 233-243 (1997); Mavluda Sattorova, Return to Local Remedies 
Rule in European BITs? Power (Inequalities), Dispute Settlement, and Change in Investment 
Treaty Law, 39:2 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 223-248 (2012). 
 287For example, Agreement on economic cooperation between the Government of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, May 16, 
1972, entered into force Sept. 7, 1973 [Netherlands-Singapore BIT], 1972, art. XI –  
The Contracting Party in the territory of which nationals of the other Contracting Party make 
or intend to make investments, shall after the exhaustion of all local administrative and 
judicial remedies, agree to any demand on the part of such nationals to submit, for 
arbitration or conciliation, to the Centre established by the Convention of Washington of 18 
March 1965 on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other 
States, any disputes that may arise in connection with the investments (emphasis added). 
 288Most of the BITs fall in this category. For example, see India-UK BIT, art.10, which 
makes no reference whatsoever to the “exhaustion principle.” Such absence is generally 
interpreted as the waiver of the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. See, Potterfield, 
supra note 286, at 3-4.   
 289For example, see the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Croatia 
and the Government of The Kingdom of Cambodia Rjon the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, May 18, 2001, entered into force June 15, 2002 [Croatia-
Cambodia BIT], art. 10.2(b): 
In case of arbitration, each Contracting Party, by this Agreement irrevocably consents in 
advance, even in the absence of an individual arbitral agreement between the Contracting 
Party and the investor, to submit any such dispute to this Centre. This consent implies the 
renunciation of the requirement that the internal administrative or judicial remedies should 
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A critical qualification to India’s consent to ISDS, as given in the 2016 
Model BIT, is that foreign investors should first exhaust local remedies for 
a period of at least five years before commencing international 
arbitration.290 These five years are to be counted from the date when the 
foreign investor first acquired knowledge of the measure in question and the 
resulting loss or damage to the investment or when the investor should have 
first acquired such knowledge.291 
The Model BIT further provides that the requirement to exhaust local 
remedies shall not be applicable “if the investor . . . can demonstrate that 
there are no available domestic legal remedies capable of reasonably 
providing any relief in respect of the same measure.”292 This provision 
present in the Model BIT gives effect to the “futility exception”293 to the 
doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies, in a limited sense. Thus, the 
burden to show that there is no reasonably available relief falls on the 
foreign investor.294 The Model BIT has another clarification attached to 
Article 15.1, which on the one hand restricts the foreign investors from 
asserting that the “obligation to exhaust local remedy does not apply on 
them,” and on the other hand, precludes the investors from claiming that 
they have complied with the exhaustion requirement on the basis that the 
claim under this treaty is by a different party or in respect of different cause 
of action. This clarification is probably an attempt to water down the effect 
of the “triple test” adopted by several tribunals while discussing the fork in 
the road provisions.295According to this test, the parallel proceedings may 
 
be exhausted (emphasis added). 
 2902016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art. 15.2.  
 291Id. art. 15.1. 
 292Id. 
 293The “futility exception” to the doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies requires that 
the local remedies not be exhausted when “there are no reasonably available local remedies 
to provide effective redress, or the local remedies provide no reasonable possibility of such 
redress” (emphasis added). Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, II:2 
Y.B. Int’l. L. Comm’n pt.3, at 76, UN Doc A/61/10 (2006), art. 15(a). The formulation in the 
Indian Model BIT apparently gives effect to the later part of art. 15(a), where despite 
existence of local remedies, there appears to be no reasonable possibility of getting a relief or 
remedy. See also, Hanessian & Duggal, Is this the Change the World Wishes to See (2017), 
supra note 38. 
 294The burden of proof imposed by the formulation of ‘futility exception’ used in the 
Model BIT is lower than that imposed by the ‘obvious futility’ rule but greater than ‘absence 
of reasonable prospects of success’ rule. For further details see the commentary to art. 15(a) 
of the Drafts Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 
 295See Occidental supra note 9, at ¶ 52: “The distinction between these different types of 
claims has relied on the test of triple identity. To the extent that a dispute might involve the 
same parties, object and cause of action, it might be considered as the same dispute and the 
‘fork in the road’ mechanism would preclude its submission to concurrent tribunals.” 
(emphasis added); Hanessian & Duggal, Is This the Change the World Wishes to See (2015), 
supra note 38.   
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be allowed at both the domestic level and the treaty level if the investor is 
able to show that the domestic remedy was availed by a different party 
(which actually may be another corporate entity within the same group), on 
a different cause of action (which is easy to show as the cause of action in 
domestic forum shall be formulated in domestic law term which would be 
different from the cause of action formulated in the treaty terms).296 While 
the Model BIT does not provide for a “fork in the road” provision, it intends 
to plug any attempt on the part on investors to circumscribe the mandatory 
requirements of exhausting the local remedies by resorting to technicalities 
and to reduce the arbitral discretion which may be exercised in this regard.   
Additional Qualifications  
The foreign investor, after exhausting all local remedies for five years, 
if no satisfactory resolution has been reached, can commence the arbitral 
process by transmission of a notice of dispute to the host state.297 This 
“notice of dispute” will be accompanied by another six months of attempts 
by the investor and the state to resolve the dispute through meaningful 
negotiation, consultation, or other third party procedures.298 In case there is 
no amicable settlement of the dispute, the investor can submit a claim to 
arbitration299 subject to the following additional conditions.: first, not more 
than six years have elapsed from the date on which the investor first 
acquired or should have acquired knowledge of the measure in question;300 
and/or, second, not more than 12 months have elapsed from the conclusion 
of domestic proceedings;301 third, before submitting the claim to arbitration, 
a minimum of 90 days’ notice has to be given to the host state;302 fourth, the 
investor must waive the “right to initiate or continue . . . any proceedings” 
under the domestic laws of the host state.303 The result of cumulative 
application of these conditions can be better understood by the following 
example. Let us assume that a measure allegedly violating the BIT came to 
the knowledge to foreign investors on May 1, 2017. The foreign investor 
must first submit the dispute in the local courts within one year of such 
knowledge. Assuming that the investor submits the dispute on 1 May 2017 
itself, domestic legal remedies should be exhausted at least for a period of 
 
 296See Gus Van Harten, Comment to Draft Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Text, https://www.mygov.in/group-issue/draft-indian-Model-bilateral-investment-treaty-text 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2017). 
 2972016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art. 15.2. 
 298Id. art. 15.4. 
 299Id. art. 15.5. 
 300Id. art. 15.5(i).  
 301Id. art. 15.5(ii); See also Hanessian & Duggal, Is This the Change the World Wishes to 
See (2015), supra note 38, at 222-23.  
 3022016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 36, art. 15.5(v). 
 303Id. art. 15.5(iii). 
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five years, i.e. until April 30, 2022, unless it can demonstrate the available 
domestic legal remedies cannot reasonably provide any relief. If the 
investor is not satisfied with the outcome of the domestic legal proceedings, 
it can submit a notice of dispute. Assuming that the “notice of dispute” is 
filed without delay on May 1, 2022 itself, a further period of six months 
must be spent by the investor trying to “amicably settle the dispute with the 
host state”, i.e. until October 31, 2022. After this, the foreign investor can 
submit a “notice of arbitration” to the host state. Only at the end of these 
further 90 days, i.e. in January 2023, can the foreign investor actually 
submit a proper “claim to arbitration”. However, this claim to arbitration 
must be submitted by April 2023, as the “claim for arbitration” must be 
submitted within 12 months from the conclusion of domestic proceedings, 
which in our example is April 30, 2022. 
Additionally, in cases where the claim is submitted by a foreign 
investor, in respect of loss or damage, to a juridical person owned or 
controlled by the former, the juridical person shall have to waive its right to 
initiate, or continue any proceedings under the laws of the host state.304 
In conclusion, the combined reading of the qualifications on ISDS that 
the 2016 Model BIT contains, makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for 
the foreign investor to make effective use of the ISDS mechanism. The 
necessary requirement to exhaust local remedies especially when the 
domestic judicial system in India is excessively burdened with a 
humungous backlog of cases305 and the rigid limitation periods, make the 
ISDS provision more favourable to host State than to foreign investor.   
XII. CONCLUSION 
India’s decision to adopt a new Model BIT, especially in light of the 
growing debate on how to reconcile investment protection with host state’s 
right to regulate, should be welcomed. India, at last, woke up, courtesy 
foreign investors suing India under different BITs, to the reality that broad 
and vague investment protection standards can be interpreted in manners 
that give precedence to investment protection over host state’s right to 
regulate. The fact that India has adopted a new Model BIT that continues to 
give the right to foreign investors to challenge India’s regulatory measures 
under BIT, shows India’s continuous engagement with the ISDS system 
unlike countries like South Africa and other Latin American countries. 
However, India has significantly altered the terms of this engagement. 
India claims that the change in the terms of this engagement is to strike 
a balance between investment protections with host state’s right to regulate. 
 
 304Id. art. 15.5(iv).  
 305See Law Commission of India, Report No. 245, Arrears and Backlog: Creating 
Additional Judicial (wo)manpower, http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/Report_No. 
245.pdf.  
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However, as the discussion in the paper shows, barring some of the 
provisions like FPS and MTPs, the Model BIT has not been able to 
reconcile the interests of foreign investors with host state’s right to regulate. 
The Model BIT contains a narrow definition of investment, an extremely 
narrow FET-type provision, excludes MFN clause, and taxation measures 
from the purview of the BIT. Furthermore, the expropriation provision in 
the Model BIT blurs the line between lawful and unlawful expropriation, it 
provides for a NPM provision without a chapeau, and contains a 
complicated and sequential ISDS. The presence of these provisions makes 
the Model BIT very pro-state with limited rights to foreign investors. 
India’s purpose behind the Model BIT seems to be to immunize itself from 
future BIT claims because Indian government is concerned about the 
financial implications of BIT awards rendered against India.306 
Furthermore, although the attempt of the Model BIT is to reduce arbitral 
discretion, as the discussion shows, many provisions still remain undefined 
and vague; thus, continue to grant significant discretion to ISDS arbitral 
tribunals. 
Indian BIT practice needs to evolve keeping two things in mind. First, 
India’s desire to increase foreign investment inflows especially under 
projects like Make in India.307 While the role of BITs in attracting foreign 
investment should not be exaggerated, there is some recent evidence to 
show that BITs in India have played an important role in attracting foreign 
investment.308 The significance of BITs for foreign investors in India also 
assumes importance because India does not enjoy the reputation of being a 
friendly place to do business. For instance, India’s rank in World Bank’s 
ease of doing business is abysmal at 130 out of 190 nations.309 When it 
comes to specific factors that are critical for foreign investors, such as 
enforcing contracts, India’s rank is even worse at 172.310 Intervention in 
businesses or regulatory abuse is common in India, which has been the key 
cause of most BIT claims against India—whether it pertains to the 
imposition of retrospective taxes,311 or sudden cancellation of licenses312 as 
mentioned before. In recent times, there have been many instances where 
 
 306See Government of India, Ministry of Finance Lok Sabha, Answer to Unstarred 
Question No: 5174, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=23651 
&lsno=16. 
 307This is a recent and major initiative of the Government of India, launched in 
September 2014 to make India a manufacturing hub by attracting foreign investment. See for 
details, Make in India, http://www.makeinindia.com/about.  
 308See Bhasin & Manocha, supra note 57; see also Nottage & Singh, supra note 57.  
 309Ease of Doing Business in India, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.doingbusiness.org 
/data/exploreeconomies/india.  
 310Id. 
 311Vodafone, supra note 72; Cairn Energy, supra note 72.  
 312Devas, supra note 73.  
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sudden and drastic changes have been made, negatively impacting 
businesses, such as the current government’s decision to suddenly withdraw 
86 percent of the currency in circulation,313 or the decision to interfere in 
the business of companies like Monsanto314 and Amazon.315 These undue 
regulatory interventions create an atmosphere of uncertainty for foreign 
investors, thus the significance of BITs. A pro-state BIT with limited 
protection to foreign investment will not be of much interest to those 
countries that are major exporters of capital to India. Indeed, after the 
adoption of the new Model BIT India has not been able to sign any BIT 
based on the new Model barring with Cambodia.316 India’s negotiations 
with the US,317 Canada,318 and EU Member countries319 are stuck due to 
disagreements over the new Model. 
Second, today, India is not just an importer but also an exporter of 
capital. India’s overseas FDI has increased from less than $1 billion in 
2000-01 to more than $21 billion in 2015-16.320 A BIT that tilts towards 
host state’s regulatory power will reduce protection for Indian companies 
abroad. The significance of BITs for Indian companies can be gauged from 
three recent instances. First, a few months back, an Indian investor, 
Flemingo Duty-free Shop Private Limited (FDF), successfully sued Poland 
under the India-Poland BIT, winning damages of €17.9 million.321 The 
tribunal found that Poland, by illegally terminating a series of lease 
agreements enjoyed by FDF’s indirect Polish subsidiary, had expropriated 
FDF’s investment and denied fair and equitable treatment to it under the 
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http://www.livemint.com/Politics/a0Fk7NwHWsKcxiu4A3i4tK/How-demonetisation-has-
impacted-key-sectors.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2017) 
 314Mayank Bhardwaj, Rupam Jain & Tom Lasseter, Cotton Crunch: Seed Giant 
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(Mar. 31, 2017), http://in.reuters.com/article/amazon-com-india-politics-idINKBN17208G.  
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http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=147849.  
 317See Ranjan, supra note 51. 
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India-Poland BIT. Second, an Indian mining company, Indian Metals & 
Ferro Alloys Ltd. (IMFA), has sued Indonesia under the India-Indonesia 
BIT at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, claiming $599 
million in damages for regulatory problems pertaining to the claimant’s 
coal mining permits.322 Third, in a newly surfaced challenge, an Indian 
investor has sued Macedonia under the India-Macedonia BIT for the alleged 
expropriation of mining concessions awarded to the Indian investor.323 
In view of the two factors mentioned above, instead of adopting an 
inward looking and a protectionist or a defensive attitude to BITs, the 
Indian BIT practice needs to emerge in a manner that balances interests of 
foreign investors without compromising India’s right to regulate. This will 
further India’s interest, both as a capital importer and also as a capital 
exporter. 
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